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Abstract
This Article focuses on the plight of the Igbo ethnic group of southeast Nigeria. It traces the
historical and political evolution of Nigeria with emphasis on ethnic relations. In arguing that the
Igbo are victims of fundamental human rights violations, references are made to relevant inter-
national human rights instruments, as well as to the various constitutional guarantees entrenched
in various Nigerian constitutions. The marginalization of the Igbo is discussed, particularly with
regard to disparities in national education programs. This Article also discusses the Igbo right
to self-determination and the failure of the international community to intervene on behalf of the
Igbo. Although it is proved that the Nigerian government has systematically breached its human
rights obligations, this Article establishes the fact that the Igbo themselves, to a great extent, cre-
ated the environment that enabled and enhanced their so-called marginalization in Nigeria. The
Article then proceeds to suggest remedies.
ISSUES ON ETHNICITY AND GOVERNANCE
IN NIGERIA: A UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE
I. Ema Oji*
INTRODUCTION
A. Brief Survey of Universal Basis for Human Rights Protection
International legal protection of human rights is embodied
in the principle of universal respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all peoples of the world.' It is a rule of law
binding on all States irrespective of the differences in their
socio-economic systems or levels. To the extent that interna-
tional law derives its binding force from agreements freely en-
tered into by States, they automatically assume two major duties:
(i) pacta sunt servanda, i.e., conscientious fulfillment of interna-
tional obligations, and (ii) responsibility for the breach of inter-
national rules. Furthermore, any domestic law is void if it con-
flicts with a peremptory, imperative jus cogens or superior norm
of general international law from which no derogation is permit-
ted and which only a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character can modify.
In the international environment, the 1960s represented an
* Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights Visiting Professor,
Fordham University School of Law, New York, N.Y. Formerly Visiting Scholar, Global
Law Program, New York University School of Law.
1. Universal concern for human rights made its entry in international politics in
the nineteenth century. Human rights featured prominently in the abolition of slave
trade, as well as in the First and Second World Wars. The modern awareness of the
universal approach for the protection of human rights was borne out of the bitter les-
sons of the Second World War. Although international collaboration has prevented a
Third World War so far, evidence of wars at varying degrees and intensities are ubiqui-
tous with their consequent deprivation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of
man. Nevertheless, the present day universal commitment to human rights protection
has brought immense relief to victims of draconian national governments across the
globe. A lot more, however, remains to be accomplished. See generally Treaty of Ver-
sailles (1919); U.N. CHARTER; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. G.A. Res.
217A (III 1948), U.N. Doc A/810 [hereinafter UDHR]; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Cove-
nant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1976);J.G. STARK, INTRO-
DUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1984); M. MOSKOWITZ, INTERNATIONAL CON-
CERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS (1974); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE (9th
ed. 1974); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1998).
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important era, for during that period many Third World na-
tions2 gained political independence and joined the community
of nations. Their struggle for independence was predicated on
the principles of fundamental human rights emphasizing the
right to self-determination as opposed to foreign domination.
Consequently, both the developed and least developed countries
became partners in running the affairs of the human society.
Most of the newly independent nations acceded to pre-existing
international treaties and conventions concluded by ex-colonial
powers.
On the regional level, many concerted efforts have been
made to promote and protect human rights. In Africa, the Or-
ganization of African Unity3 ("O.A.U.") adopted the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1981 ("Banjul Char-
ter"). 4 It was intended to fill the void created by the O.A.U.
Charter with respect to human rights, specifically the absence of
their particular guarantees in the Charter and the machinery to-
wards the realization of these rights. The Banjul Charter, while
reaffirming the rights contained in the UDHR, however, empha-
sized human rights based upon an African legal philosophy and
responsive to African needs.5
Upon independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria inherited,
among others, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("UDHR") .6 The UDHR provides for civil and political rights as
well as economic, social, and cultural rights. Despite a few short-
comings, the UDHR could be said to be a summation of the
most basic human rights. Although, the UDHR fell short of cre-
ating positive law directly binding on States, States have agreed
that "the UDHR constitutes an obligation for the members of
the international community. '
Nigerian constitutions from 1960-1999 have had fundamen-
tal rights entrenched in them. By their nature, rights guaran-
2. Also often referred to as "Least Developed Nations," "Developing Nations," or
"Economically Backward States."
3. In the process of restructuring under a new name "The African Union."
4. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27 1981, entered into
force October 21 1986, available in 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
5. Richard Gittleman, The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: A Legal
Analysis, 22 VA.J. INT'L L. 667, 668 n.4 (1982).
6. UDHR, supra note 1.
7. United Nations Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, Iran (1968). See 63
Am. J. INT'L L. 674 (1969) for the full text of the Teheran Resolution.
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teed by the constitution are supreme because the executive and
the legislature cannot override them unless the constitution is
amended by a decree.8 These constitutions reflected principles
derived from human nature, which were aptly expressed by
ThomasJefferson in the original draft for the Declaration of the
Independence of the United States of America in 1776: "We
hold these Truths to be self-evident that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain ina-
lienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and pursuit of
happiness .... "'
B. Issues
For thirty months, between 1967 and 1970, a civil war rav-
aged Nigeria's eastern region following an attempted secession
by the Igbo people under the name of "Republic of Biafra."
Thirty-one years since the ethnic-motivated pogrom and conse-
quent bloody civil war, ethnicity and abuse of fundamental rights
and freedom continue unabated. The permanent state of milita-
rism that lasted for over three decades in Nigeria did not help
matters. The ethnic biases, sectionalism, and bitterness resulting
from the civil war, have refused to go away. It is felt, seen, and
lived daily in Nigeria. It has become a way of life.
Ethnicity refers to a selected cultural and physical character-
istic used to classify people into (ethnic) groups or categories
considered to be significantly different from others.'" Defined
as a subgroup that shares a common ancestry, history, or culture,
ethnicity is determined by a number of factors: geographic ori-
gins, family patterns, language, values, cultural norms, religion,
literature, music, dietary patterns, gender roles, and employ-
8. The military consistently abused the constitutions by use of decrees.
9. See American Declaration of Independence of 1776. The liberal tradition of
human rights may be explained in two ways. One way is to adopt the social contract
theory as an analytical tool. The other is the acceptance of the natural law tradition.
Man has rights because he is human being and not necessarily because of any other
reason like his consent to a contract. The idea of contract, admittedly, is vital to the
smooth functioning of a State structure.
10. The study of ethnicity has attracted a multi-disciplinary approach since the
term was first introduced by American sociologist David Reisman in 1953. However the
word "ethnic" is much older. See generally DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CON-
FLICT (1985); THOMAS H. ERIKSEN, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE (1993); ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymalicka eds.,
1997).
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ment patterns."i
Distinction is sometimes made between ethnicity, that is eth-
nic spite or parochialism, called "tribalism," and ethnic dignity
as a human right which often features in the national question
or human rights question.' 2 Often, an ethnic group is op-
pressed, exploited, marginalized, or discriminated against by
leaders from one or more ethnic groups in a stronger political,
economic, or social position. Resentment to such disability, the
resultant desire forjustice and equity, and a consequent struggle
to have ethnically manifested wrongs righted, is not ethnicity.
Rather, Toyo argued:
[I] t is a cry or struggle for the human dignity of people who
form an ethnic group. It belongs to the category of conten-
tion or struggle for human rights. Freedom from oppression,
exploitation, or other injustice on the ground of ethnic dif-
ference is a human right. It also deserves to be a citizenship
right in Nigeria."3
Issues arising from ethnicity in Nigeria have been of im-
mense concern to Nigerians both at home and in the diaspora.
In an article, Ethnicity as an Epiphenomenon in Nigeria's Leadership
Problem, 4 Douglas Anele wrote: "the theory of scape-goatism,
that is the doctrine that a particular geopolitical group is respon-
sible for the political problems of Nigeria whereas another
group has been, at best, the victim of deliberate marginalization
by the dominant group has become hackneyed."
The on-going agitations by various ethnic groups are a di-
rect result of what has widely became known in Nigerian lexicon
as "marginalization." The Hausa/Fulani of the North are com-
plaining about marginalization in the area of education and eco-
nomic development. The Igbo are crying marginalization in al-
11. In Nigeria, an important part of ethnicity is religion. The recent introduction
and implementation of the Sharia in many States in the North has further ignited eth-
nic-religious conflicts in the country. Nigeria is a secular State, as provided by Article 10
of the Constitution. Although the Constitution allows for Sharia courts as well as cus-
tomary law courts (arts. 260, 262), there is no basis in the Constitution for the establish-
ment of Islamic law within the sovereign State of Nigeria. The combination of ethnicity
and religious fanaticism in parts of the country has further contributed to serious abuse
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Nigeria, presenting obstacles to Nige-
ria's unity, stability, and progress.
12. Eskor Toyo, Combating Ethnicity, US-AFRICAN VOICE, June 1999.
13. Id.
14. LAGOS VANGUARD, Opinion Page, Nov. 19, 2000.
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most every aspect of national endeavor, including political, mili-
tary, and senior civil service appointments and promotions, as
well as economic and social development. They also complain
about the non-implementation of the Reconciliation, Recon-
struction, and Rehabilitation program promised at the end of
the civil war in 1970. The Yoruba are displeased, among other
things, with the early retirement of their qualified and exper-
ienced nationals from the civil services during the military dicta-
torships. The South-South, which comprises the oil-rich states of
Nigeria, are pushing for full control of their natural resources.
Deriving from the foregoing is a multiplicity of ethnic mili-
tias formed by the various nationalities to fight for their respec-
tive demand for self-determination. Notable among the militia
organizations are the Oldua Peoples' Congress ("OPC"), a pan-
Yoruba movement; the Bakasi Boys and the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra ("MASSOB"), who
have the backing of the Igbo nation; the Movement for the Sur-
vival of Ogoni People ("MOSOP"), whose former leader, Ken
Saro-Wiwa along with eight other members were executed in
1995 by the late General Abacha's regime; the Arewa Consulta-
tive Forum ("ACF") of the Hausa/Fulani extraction; the Egbesu
Boys, in the forefront for the South-South group of States; and
the Ijaw Youth Congress. These ethnic armies have different mo-
dus operandi, different agenda, and aim for different results.
This Article focuses on the plight of the Igbo ethnic group
of southeast Nigeria. It traces the historical and political evolu-
tion of Nigeria with emphasis on ethnic relations. In arguing
that the Igbo are victims of fundamental human rights viola-
tions, references are made to relevant international human
rights instruments, as well as to the various constitutional guar-
antees entrenched in various Nigerian constitutions. The
marginalization of the Igbo is discussed, particularly with regard
to disparities in national education programs. This Article also
discusses the Igbo right to self-determination and the failure of
the international community to intervene on behalf of the Igbo.
Although it is proved that the Nigerian government has system-
atically breached its human rights obligations, this Article estab-
lishes the fact that the Igbo themselves, to a great extent, created
the environment that enabled and enhanced their so-called
marginalization in Nigeria. The Article then proceeds to suggest
remedies.
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I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
"God did not create Nigeria, the British did."
- Sir Ahmadu Bello, (The late Sarduana of Sokoto).
Prior to the incursion of the British explorers and
merchants, the area now called Nigeria was inhabited by various
ethnic nationalities, which interacted among themselves, partic-
ularly in commerce. They were organized and governed on the
basis of the principles of kingship, family, and age, which later
developed in many different directions. Some remained com-
munal democracies. Others became kingdoms, emirates, and
empires.1 5 These traditional institutions of governance in-
cluded, for instance, the kingdoms of the Opobos; the Jukuns;
the Sokoto caliphate, comprising a number of emirates; and the
empires of Kanem Bornu, Oyo, Benin, and Kwara. In the mostly
chief-less societies in the Eastern part of the territory, the main
political authority among the Igbo rested with the age grade 6 or
family.' 7
Present day Nigeria is a vast nation of an estimated 100 mil-
lion people occupying an area of 923,770 square kilometers. Of
Nigeria's approximately 250 ethnic groups, three are statistically
relevant, namely: the Hausa/Fulani, the Igbo, and the Yoruba."8
Together with the three major ethnic groups, others, like the
Ijaw, the Efik/Ibibion, and the Tiv are considered coherent sub-
cultures with shared languages and bodies of traditions. There-
fore, Nigeria may be called a nation of ethnic minorities.
A. The British Conquest
The romance with the British, which eventually produced
today's Nigeria, started in 1861, with the establishment of the
colony of Lagos. Through deceit, bribes, and brutal force, Brit-
ain was able to extend and strengthen its earlier conquests in the
coastal communities of the South into a vast colonial territory.
15. DIRECTORATE FOR SOCIAL MOBILIZATION ("MAMSER"): POLITICAL EDUCATION
MANUAL, ABUJA 3-4 (1989).
16. An age grade is a group of people born within four or five years of eachother.
17. See G.C. IFEMESIA, TRADITIONAL HUMANE LIVING AMONG THE IGBO (1979); E.N.
NJAKA, IGBO POLITICAL CULTURE (Evanston ed., 1974); DARYL FORDE & G.I. JONES, IGBO
AND IBIBIO-SPEAKING PEOPLES OF SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA (1950); CHINUA ACHEBE,
THINGS FALL APART (1958).
18. Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba make up roughly 65% of Nigeria's popula-
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Initially, the motive was economic exploitation of the vast re-
sources of the areas. But a system to facilitate political domina-
tion followed soon afterwards. By 1906, the Niger Coast Protec-
torate, established in 1897, merged with Lagos and renamed the
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Meanwhile, the Royal Niger
Company administered the area north of Lokoja on behalf of
the British. Britain assumed active control of the company in
1900, naming the area the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria,
and appointed Frederick Lugard as the High Commissioner.
These skirmishes paved the way for the great amalgamation
of the Southern and Northern Protectorates by Lugard in 1914.
Thus, a nation was created, and named "Nigeria." Different eth-
nic nationalities became grouped together as one nation. It was
not long thereafter that the artificiality and un-workability of the
enterprise became evident. However, the arrangement ensued,
despite serious opposition by the various ethnic groups, until at-
tainment of independence.
B. Emancipation
The road to independence was rough, but not bloody. The
approach was constructive and persistent. Freedom was not eas-
ily won or readily conceded, but it was achieved on October 1,
1960.' g
Efforts to patchwork Nigeria together into one indivisible
body began in 1922 with' the Clifford Constitution. It was re-
placed in 1946 with the Richard's Constitution. Two more con-
stitutions, the 1951 Macpherson Constitution and the 1954 Lyt-
tleton Constitution, followed before the independence Constitu-
tion of 1960. Whereas the first two constitutions were mere
documents single-handedly enacted by the men whose names
they bore, without seeking public opinion, the 1951, 1954, and
1960 constitutions, to a reasonable extent, met the patterns of
procedure for constitution making. In the case of the indepen-
dence Constitution of 1960, a series of constitutional confer-
ences were held in Britain and Nigeria, and a wide spectrum of
19. Nigerian opposition to foreign rule came in two forms; resistance to coloniza-
tion and, later, opposition to colonial rule, followed by the demand for independence.
Naturally, the nationalist movement in Nigeria started with the desired exclusion of
colonial and cultural domination of the political, economic, social, and cultural life of
the people. Opposition to cultural domination was only smoldering whilst opposition
to foreign rule was visible.
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public opinion was consulted. By then however, political parties
and associations had sprung up. The ethnic diversity of Nigeria
was greatly reflected by the fact that a total of 107 parties or as-
sociations emerged.20 Three political parties, the Northern Peo-
ples Congress ("NPC"), the National Convention of Nigerian
Citizens ("NCNC"), and the Action Group ("AG"), dominated by
the three major ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yo-
ruba, respectively, had remarkable impact at the national level.2 '
Ethnic consciousness was so pronounced in Nigeria that the
old national anthem adopted at independence read in part
"though tribe and tongue may differ in brotherhood we stand
... ." Subsequent events that plunged the country into ethni-
cally enhanced political crisis showed that much more was
needed than mere lyrics of a national anthem. The civil war,
militarism, and military intervention in politics, enabled one eth-
nic group to perpetuate its domination of governance to the bit-
ter exclusion of the other component nationalities. Human
rights and fundamental freedoms suffered serious setbacks.
With the 1963 Republican Constitution, all legal and politi-
cal links with the Queen and the British Crown were severed.
Three notable constitutions have been promulgated in recent
times, the 1979, 1989, and 1999.22 The 1979 Constitution was
modeled on a system similar to that of the United States of
America. This was a bold departure from the parliamentary de-
mocracy inherited from the British at independence. But in
1983, the presidential system which has endured in the United
States for over two centuries, was terminated after only four years
of use in Nigeria. From then until May 1999, when the incum-
bent, President (Retired General) Olusegun Obasanjo was inau-
gurated, the military had a field day in power.23
20. Eighty-one political parties and twenty-six tribal and cultural associations.
21. See generally IBADAN, GROUNDWORK OF NIGERIAN HISTORY (Obaro Ikime ed.,
1980); TEKENA N. TAMANO, THE EVOLUTION OF THE NIGERIAN STATE: THE SOUTHERN
PHASE 1898-1914 (1972).
22. All three constitutions were master minded by the military governments that
had ruled the country at various times: General Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979), Gen-
eral Ibrahim Gbadamosi Babangida (1985-1993), and General Abdusalami Abubakar
(1998-1999). The 1999 Constitution is a slightly adjusted version of the 1979 Constitu-
tion. The 1989 Constitution was never really implemented.
23. The Interim National Government of 1993 ("ING") was an arrangement put in
place by General Babangida after the annulment of the 1993 general elections in Nige-
ria. The elections were widely believed to have been won by Chief Moshod Kolawole 0.
Abiola (who died in detention, fighting to validate his mandate from the majority of
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II. PROLEGOMENON TO MILITARISM IN AFRICA AND THE
ROLE OF ETHNICITY IN THE MILITARIZATION
OF NIGERIA
"When ... Mao Tse-tung, former Chinese leader, was
quoted as having said that: 'political power grows out of the bar-
rel of the gun,' though, he was probably referring to his native
country, China, yet he could as well be thinking elsewhere, like
Africa."24 Many theories have been advanced to explain the phe-
nomenon of military coups d'etat, particularly in Africa. The most
relevant posits that the military seize power because of a break-
down in political power, arising from mismanagement by the ci-
vilian government.25  According to Samuel Huntington,
"[firequent coup d'etat should not be viewed as pathological but
as a healthy mechanism of gradual change, the non-constitu-
tional equivalent of periodic changes, in party control through
the electoral process. '"26 The significance of such theory is that
some civilian governments manipulate the State, constitution,
and the democratic process in order to perpetrate their stay in
power. Thus, a coup has become a way to bring about a change
of government through the power of the gun.
In Nigeria, misunderstanding between the political leaders,
tribal or ethnic interests, or nationalist impetus played a vital
role in the January 15, 1966 military coup d'etat. The docile na-
ture of the post-independence ruling elites also contributed to
the first coup in Nigeria.
Nigerians who voted for him). The ING, which only lasted a few months under the
chairmanship of Chief Ernest Shonekan, facilitated the eventual take over by General
Sani Abacha (who died in office in 1998).
24. Sunday Olagunju, The CoupFever, TIMES INT'LJan. 27,1986, at 5 (quoting Mao
Tse-Tung).
25. Id. at 5 (citing SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETY
(1968)).
26. Id. at 5; see also Obie Chukwumba, Another Radio Coup, AFRICAN CONCORD, May
28, 1990, at 19. In another article, Coups: Africa's Headache?, Olagunju wrote:
The two decades, 1950-1970 witnessed a dramatic transformation in the for-
tunes of several African nations. Ever since King Farouk of Egypt was toppled
by a military coup d'etat, master minded by colonel Abdul Camal Nasser in the
summer of 1952, the writing was on the wall for all democratically constituted
government in black Africa to read, though apparently, few of them read
it .... Thus the general proposition that military take-overs in Africa reflect
urban and intellectual discontent, as well as a vacuum of national power, and
infrastructural under-development... which being at the same time the prod-
uct of the characteristics of particular military sub-committees and their lead-
ers, seems a reasonable hypothesis with which to begin.
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The structural theory of coups seems realistic because more
than anything else, it emphasizes the socio-economic circum-
stances as solely responsible for military intervention in govern-
ance. Thus, the inability of the ruling elite to solve internal
socio-political and economic problems, led to dissatisfaction,
particularly among the educated elites, about the despicable, in-
ept, and despotic nature of the government as evidenced in the
Nigerian coup that toppled President Shehu Shagari in 1983.27
Consequently, there was a general apathy on the part of the citi-
zenry due to dissatisfaction with the socio-economic system. In
Nigeria, General Babangida justified his coup against General
Buhari in 1985, on this theory, as did General Sani Abacha in his
palace coup against Chief Shonekan's Interim National Govern-
ment ("ING") in 1993.
The role of external forces in the occurrence of coups
should also be taken seriously. Professional interests of the mili-
tary should be a matter of concern for any civilian government
in power. When the military feels utterly neglected and their
welfare undermined, they soon become despondent and a way
out could be mutiny or seizure of power. This was evident in the
late General Murtala Muhammed's coup that chased General
Yakubu Gowon out of power in 1975. After a bitter thirty-month
civil war against Biafra (1967-1970), Nigerian soldiers expected a
better deal from General Gowon than what took place.
Advocates of coup argue that the politicians often dig their
own graves by politicizing the military and thereby involving
them in political and tribal riots, as often is the case in Nigeria.
Lessons have shown that coups, particularly in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America, are products of naked forces that often impel
each other and quite candidly:
27. See General Muhammadu Buhari, Why We Toppled Shagari, THIsDAY NEWS, Nov.
25, 2001, at http://www.thisdayonline.com/news/20011125news01.html. Buhari, who
toppled the regime of President Shehu Shagari, on December 31, 1983, in a recent
lecture titled Military Class, Political Class and Good Governance in Nigeria described Niger-
ian politicians as "democrats of convenience," and warned that "the political class must
put its acts together to prevent a situation where they would be left in the cold." Justify-
ing his reasons for the overthrow, Buhari observed "The Second republic was doomed
from the start on account of incompetence, impatience with the new system which poli-
ticians were unwilling to nurture, failure to be fair, gross corruption and near total
indifference to the needs of the country." He noted that, "they are their own worst
enemies because they have very little commitment to democracy beyond election day
... and when they lose, politicians refuse to accept the verdicts and invite the military to
return." Id.
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[T]hey lack legitimate procedure for achieving their spelt-out
goals... each group employs means which reflects its pecu-
liar nature and capabilities... bribery, students riots, workers
strike, mob demonstration more often, form the basis and act
as catalyst to eventual military coups of the ruling oligarchy.
2 8
A. Traditional Antagonisms and Division
At independence, the Nigerian army was made up of about
8,000 officers and men, all of whom were transferred from the
West African Frontier Force. Their individual and collective per-
ception was purely military. They were not exposed to politics
and so they did not know what power looked like. It even
sounded strange to them that military men should ever contem-
plate being in government.
The late Alhaji (Sir) Abubaka Tafawa Balewa became the
Prime Minister in 1960. He won the office on the platform of
the NPC. He was the deputy leader of the party, and so he had
no alternative but to take dictations from his political boss, the
late Sarduana of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello. The Sarduana was
the Premier of Northern Nigeria. Because of traditional rea-
sons, the Sarduana decided to remain in Kaduna, from where he
directed the affairs of the nation.
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the AG, became the
Premier of the Western region; Dr. Michael I. Opara, the East-
ern region; and Chief Denis Osadebey, the Mid-Western region.
They all operated regional policies respectively. Soon, the in-
cohesive political nature of the country ignited various conflicts
that engulfed the nation. From that period, ethnic biases were
born, and arguably still have full effect today in every depart-
ment of government and among the ordinary citizens of Nigeria.
The late Sarduana of Sokoto, through the Federal Prime
Minister, Balewa, projected the political philosophy of his region
resulting in discomfort in some parts of the country. His bid was
always done at the center. Seeing political power as a sure bea-
con of hope to pursue his political dream, he schemed and uti-
lized it very effectively. Enjoying the numerical strength of the
North, the Sarduana ensured that all elections held in the
North, whether federal or regional, favored him and his political
party. Though the NCNC and the AG in the East and West re-
28. Olagunju, supra note 24.
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spectively, also used their regional power to affect an impact at
the federal level, the Sarduana's tactics eluded them.
The regional concept developed by the three political par-
ties affected the 1963 federal census. 29 The stalemated census
was an offshoot of the problems of the North, which blossomed
further because of regional factors. Meanwhile, the Tiv of the
Benue area, who had started to call for a separate State of their
own, being predominantly Christians, could not stand the op-
pressive rule of the then Northern government. The riots that
followed attracted the wrath of the NPC government. 30 The ri-
ots continued unabated whilst the first post-independence fed-
eral elections were held in 1964. Chief Awolowo, determined to
neutralize the influences of the Northern caliphate at the
center, resigned his position as Premier of the West, and opted
to go to the center. He nominated his deputy and closest confi-
dant, Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, to take over his place in
the West. However, before the elections, Awolowo made a suc-
cessful in-road into the North, particularly in the Middle belt ar-
eas where he supported Tiv's cause. Awolowo's move courted
the anger and wrath of the Northern leaders. The situation be-
came inflamed further.'
The NPC won the subsequent federal elections, beating the
NCNC and the AG in the process. The NCNC and the AG ac-
cused the NPC of using federal might to win the elections. The
NPC countered by accusing the NCNC and the AG of rigging
the elections in their regional strongholds. The problem be-
came compounded and for nearly one week the nation had no
federal government. The NPC took advantage of the quarrel
that had developed between Awolowo and Akintola to form an
alliance between the NPC and National Democratic Party
("NDP") headed by Akintola. The alliance was called the Niger-
29. The 1963 national census figure was falsified. It was alleged by other political
parties that the NPC used this to their advantage because census officers, who should
have been allowed to go into the harems to count people were not allowed to do so.
Rather, it was the head of the family that gave arbitrary figures to them. This made the
population of the North increase to the disenchantment of the Southern political lead-
ers.
30. JAMES 0. OJIAKO, 13 YEARS OF MILITARY RULE 3 (1979); see also RICHARD AKIN-
NOLA, HISTORY OF Coup d'Etat IN NIGERIA 6 (1998).
31. Poor leadership was the major problem with Nigeria's politics and economic
development. The Balewa government that steered the ship of the nation at political
independence from Britain depended on the imperialist dictates of Britain.
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ian National Alliance ("NNA"). The NPC saw the move as a way
of taking revenge against Awolowo for his actions during the
campaigns in the North. In a swift reaction, the NCNC and AG
allied themselves and became the United Progressive Grand Alli-
ance ("UPGA") .32
There were impending 1965 Western regional elections.
The NPC's motive was to control the West through Akintola.
The elections came and Akintola won using federal power to his
advantage. The Electoral Commission was alleged to have
rigged the elections because of federal pressure. The AG re-
jected the election. The country was thrown into confusion be-
cause riots had started in the Western region. Policing was in-
creased constantly in the West and Tiv areas. The situation dete-
riorated to the extent that the NPC-controlled federal
government conceptualized moves to pour in military troops
into the two areas.
Subsequently, young military officers led by Chukwuma
'Kaduna' Nzegwu, a Major in the Nigeria army, decided it was
time to effect a change, through "the barrels of the guns." So,
on the night of January 15, 1966, they struck, killing in the pro-
cess, the following prominent Northern politicians: the Prime
Minister, Tafawa Balewa; and the Sarduana of Sokoto, Sir
Ahmadu Bello. In the West, Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola,
then Premier of the region, was also killed. In the Mid-Western
region, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, then federal Minister of Fi-
nance was killed. There were no casualties in the East.
Though a military intervention suited the political griev-
ances of the era, the manner of its execution engendered little
tribal sentiment. And it did, indeed, trigger the first of a chain
of coups detat that Nigerians contended with for close to three
decades, until the return to democracy on May 29, 1999.
B. Dawn of The Militaristic Era In Nigeria
The smoldering volcano of rampage, arson, pillage, and
jungle justice, triggered off by the allegations that the Western
32. Chief Awolowo was subsequently tried (with some prominent members of his
group, which included Chief Anthony Enahoro and Chief Lateef Jakunde) on the
charges of treasonable felony and conspiracy and jailed in 1963. They were released on
August 2, 1966 by General Yakubu Gowon, who succeeded late General Ironsi as Com-
mander-in-Chief and Head of State of Nigeria in the aftermath of the January 15, 1966
military coup in Nigeria.
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region elections were rigged, provided a fertile ground for the
military to seize power on January 15, 1966. Announcing the
reasons for the coup, Major C.K. Nzegwu, said:
In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the
Nigerian Armed Forces, I declare martial law over the North-
ern provinces of Nigeria ... We seized power to stamp out
tribalism, nepotism and regionalism ... The constitution is
suspended and the regional government and elected assem-
blies are hereby dissolved. All political parties, cultural, tribal
and trade union activities, together with all demonstrations
and unauthorized gatherings, excluding religious worships,
are banned until we established a strong, united and prosper-
ous nation, free from corruption and internal strife ... All
treaty obligations previously entered into with any foreign na-
tion will be respected, and we hope that such nations will re-
spect our country's territorial integrity and will avoid taking
sides with enemies of the revolution and enemies of the peo-
ple .... 3
3
At the same time, in exercise of his constitutional preroga-
tives as the Senate president, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, who by virtue of
his office was then the Acting President of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, made the following broadcast to the nation:
I have to-night been advised by the Council of Ministers that
they had come to the unanimous decision voluntarily to hand
over administration of the country to the armed forces of the
Republic with immediate effect . . . I will now call upon the
General Officer Commanding Nigerian Army, Major General
Aguiyi-Ironsi, to make a statement to the nation on the policy
of the administration ....
Johnson Umunakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi, Major General of the Nigeria
Army, of Igbo ethnic origin, took up his army and aborted the
"revolution" led by Major Nzegwu, who was also Igbo. The late
General Aguiyi-Ironsi thus became the first indigenous (Niger-
ian) Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria. The
General knew the ailments afflicting the country but his ap-
proach to them did not quite address the issues. The plotters of
the January revolution were arrested, but were not tried. Gen-
33. OJIAKO, supra note 30.
34. Id. at 6. One major factor that informed military intervention in Nigeria in
1966, was the state of disarray in the NPC-NCNC coalition and the consequent failure to
exercise appropriate political influence on the government.
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eral Aguiyi-Ironsi probably thought that the appointment of Lt.
Colonel Yakubo Gowon (as he then was), who was a Northerner,
as his Chief of Army Staff could heal the wounds and grievances
of Northerners who felt cheated by the trend of events.
General Aguiyi-Ironsi, in the military tradition, announced
decrees 35 for suspending parts of the federal constitution, the
offices of the President and Prime Minister, and establishing a
military government in each of the four regions. 36 He ap-
pointed the following regional governors: Lt. Colonels
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (East), F.A. Fajuyi (West),
David A. Ejoor (Mid-West), and Hassan Katsina (North). Of all
the reforms introduced by the new administration, the climax
was the replacement of federalism with the unitary system of gov-
ernment. Northerners felt cheated and unveiled their fear of
the implication of Igbo 37 domination by agitating vehemently
for an abrogation of the unitary system. Ironsi's reason for the
unitary system was that the federal system had forced politicians
to play on tribal passions to cement their supporters and thus
had driven a wedge between the country's regions. 8
C. The Revenge Coup
The January 15, 1966 revolution was widely interpreted in
many quarters, including the British Broadcasting Corporation
("BBC") in ethnic terms. The insinuations that the Igbo master
plan was to dominate the polity and dictate the pace of events
rather than a bid for clean government (in the language of the
coup makers) prompted Northern officers in the armed forces to
over throw General Ironsi's military government.
So, on July 29, 1966, while Ironsi was on an official visit to
the Western region, the Northern officers mutinied, arrested
General Aguiyi-Ironsi at Ibadan, and killed him along with his
host, Lt. Colonel Fajuyi (Governor of the Western region), de-
35. See, e.g., The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 1
(1966). By Decree No. 34 of May 24, 1966, the Military dissolved all existing political
parties and prohibited the formation of new ones. See also OJQAKO, supra note 30, at 18.,
36. OjiKo, supra note 30, at 23.
37. Of all the fourteen principal planners of the 1966 coup, only two were non-
Igbo. But see M.O. Ene, Unsettling Accounts About Biafta, NIGERAWORLD, May 9, 2000,
available at http://www.nigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/ene/0509400.html (re-
joinder to Edwin Madunagu, Settling Accounts with Biafta).
38. OQjtKo, supra note 30, at 3-7.
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spite vehement resistance by the latter for the mutineers to spare
the life of his guest.
Meanwhile, in the North, Igbo were massacred in large
numbers and their properties destroyed. The hostilities contin-
ued for several days. In a national broadcast on August 1, 1967,
Colonel Yakubu Gowon told the aggrieved nation that he had
been brought to the position of "having to shoulder the great
responsibilities of this country and the armed forces with the
consent of majority of the members of the Supreme Military
Council .... ." At Enugu on the same day, Lt. Colonel C. 0.
Ojukwu, Eastern Military Governor, said that the "brutal and
planned annihilation of officers of Eastern Nigeria origin had
cast serious doubt as to whether they could ever sincerely live
together as members of a nation . . ."' Disturbances broke out
in many parts of the country. For days nothing happened all
over the territory except killings, looting, arson, and general
confusion.
D. Coloration of Events
1. Principal Actors and Victims in the January 15,
1966 Revolution
Actors
Majors
Chukwuma K. Nzegwu Igbo
Emmanuel Ifeajuna Igbo
D. Okafor Igbo
C.I. Anuforo Igbo
I.H. Chukuka Igbo
T. Onwuatuegwu Igbo
Adegboyega non-Igbo
Captains
G.O. Oji Igbo
Gbulie Igbo
E.N. Nwobosi Igbo
Lt. B.O.O. Oyewole non-Igbo
2nd Lts.
N.S. Wokocha Igbo
Ojukwu Igbo
Azubuogu Igbo
39. Id. at 48.
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Victims
Brigadiers
Sam A. Ademulegun not Igbo
Z. Maimalari not Igbo
Colonels
K Mohamed not Igbo
Ralf A. Sodeinde not Igbo
Lt. Cols.
Y. Paur not Igbo
A.C. Unegbu Igbo
Major Sam. Adegoke not Igbo
2. Principal Actors and Victims in the
Counter-coup of July 29, 1966
Actors
The counter-coup was masterminded and executed entirely
by Northern officers in the army.
Victims
Lt. Colonels
I.C. Okoro Igbo
G. Okonweze Igbo
Majors
T.E. Nzeogwu Igbo
B. Nnamani Igbo
C.C. Emelifeonwu Igbo
J.I. Obienu Igbo
P.C. Obi Igbo
Ibanga Ekanem not Igbo
O.U. Isong not Igbo
A. Drummond not Igbo
By this roll call, both the January 15, 1966 revolution and
the July 29, 1966 counter-coup, unequivocally presented ethnic
pictures. The July putsch was reactionary and a bold retaliation
against the Igbo. It was not surprising therefore, that the Igbo
were killed in large numbers in the North.
In an attempt to put the records straight regarding the 1966
coup and the subsequent crises, the Federal Government came
out with the following statement on January 14, 1967, entitled
"Nigeria 1966," listing the names of the soldiers who planned
and executed the military coup of January 15, 1966:
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As far back as December 1964, a small group of Army Officers
mainly from the Ibo40 ethnic group of Eastern Region dissat-
isfied with the political development within the Federation
began to plot, in collaboration with some civilians, the over-
throw of what was then the Government of the Federation of
Nigeria and the eventual assumption of power in the country
The 1965 plan by the same officers which was executed on
January 15, 1966 was hatched out finally in Abeokuta during
the All Arms Battle Group Course there. The course was orig-
inally planned to be held in Kaduna in Northern Region. But
suddenly the Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, the
late Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, changed the venue and or-
dered that the course should be held in Abeokuta. All the
officers involved in the plot to overthrow the Government
were given assignments to do at the course.
There are five Battalions in the Nigerian army. Prior to the
Abeokuta course, three of these were commanded by Ibo of-
ficers. One of the two not commanded by Ibo officers was the
one at Enugu commanded by the late Lt. Col. Adekunle
Fajuyi (A Yoruba officer). To pave the way for an almost all-
Ibo command, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi sent Fajuyi to con-
duct the Abeokuta course. So on the eve of the coup, four of
the five battalions of the Army were under the command of
Ibo officers. This was done to facilitate the command in case
members of the army revolted against the coup.
The coup was termed among the plotters "Exercise Damissa"
which translated from its Hausa language means "Exercise Ti-
ger."
Although the original plan stipulated that the action in-
tended by the plotters should take place simultaneously in all
the regional capitals (Kaduna, Ibadan, Enugu, Benin and La-
gos), all available information indicates that there was in fact
no intention to carry out the plan in Benin and Enugu. In
Benin, an Ibo man of Mid-West origin was Premier and head
of the Regional Government while in Enugu another Ibo
man was Premier and head of East Regional Government.
40. "Ibo" or "Igbo" can mean the same thing: "the people." There is the belief
that "Ibo" is the English version of "Igbo." Sometimes "Igbo " stands for the language
while "Ibo" is employed to suggest the people. In this Article I use "Igbo" to mean the
entire "Igbo" as an ethnic nation, as well as the language (where applicable). Where
reference is made to one particular individual who is "igbo" by nationality, I use
"Igboman" for emphasis, in the singular form. "Ndigbo" means Igbo or Ibo as an eth-
nic group.
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The plotters brought in some junior officers and other ranks
to assist in the execution of their plans, on the threat of death
if they refused to collaborate, others participated as soldiers
obeying instructions although some joined the revolt of their
own free will.
" In charge of the Lagos operation of the plot were Cap-
tain Oji, Major E. Ifeajuna, Major I. Anuforo, Major
I.H. Chukuka, Major D. Okafor and Major
Ademoyega.
* In charge of the Ibadan operation were Captain E.N.
Nwobosi, Second Lt. N. S. Wokocha, Lt. B. 0. Oyewole
and Captain Gbulie.
" In charge of Kaduna operation were Major C.K.
Nzegwu, Major T. Onwuatuegwu, Second Lt.
Azubuogu and Second Lt. Ojukwu.
Lt. Col. 0. Ojukwu seized Kano Airport operation on January
15 and 16 and was later appointed Military Governor of East-
ern Group of Provinces by the former Head of State Major-
General Aguiyi-Ironsi, Lt. Col. Ojukwu was then the battalion
commander of 5th Battalion at Kano.
After Lt. Col. Ojukwu had seized Kano Airport on Saturday,
January 15, he took the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero,
from his palace to the barracks, sent away the Emir's
councilors and the Provincial Commissioner and asked the
Emir to come and make a broadcast to his people informing
them that a new Government had taken over. All these hap-
pened ever before Major-General Ironsi announced taking
over the Federal Government in Lagos from the Civilian Gov-
ernment.
The plan of the army officers appeared to have been success-
fully carried out in Kaduna and Ibadan but in Lagos the coup
was foiled by the intervention of the bulk of the Nigerian
Army.4 '
The implication of the above text is a clear indictment of
the Igbo over the military coup of January 15, 1966. From its
content, it had every element of authenticity. But, it could
equally have been propaganda to justify the counter-coup of July
29, 1966. Whichever position one is inclined to take, the impor-
tance of the text is that it has, for thirty-four years remained the
foundation upon which the plight suffered by the Igbo in the
present day Nigeria is based.
41. AKINNOLA, supra note 30.
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As a result, Colonel Ojukwu, after consulting with Igbo lead-
ers, opted for secession, under the name of Republic of Biafra.42
The bitter civil war that resulted from the declaration of the Re-
public of Biafra by the Eastern region government in May 1967
was fought for thirty months, ending in January 1970.
Presenting a keynote address on September 3, 2001, at a
conference organized by the Program on Ethnic and Federal
Studies ("PEFS") of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, on the
topic "The Civil War and Its Aftermath" former Head of State of
Nigeria and beneficiary of the northern-led counter coup of July
29, 1966, who also fought the civil war in that capacity, General
Yakubu Gowon, claimed that the war resulted from the euphoria
of Nigerian's independence, and the struggle after indepen-
dence between regional leaders for social and political space.43
He also said:
[I]t was the first time since amalgamation of 1914 that our
indigenous leadership was in full control of political power
... [T] he failure of the Aburi meeting.., and the outbreak
of ethnic hostilities and the indiscriminate killings in the
North and East further complicated and aggravated the situa-
tion .... There was also the growing inter-ethnic rivalry and
suspicion between the three major ethnic groups-Hausa/Fu-
lani, Igbo and Yoruba .... 44 .
In what was termed his first formal comment on the civil war
since the overthrow of his administration in 1975, the General
added:
The January 1966 coup with its selective killings and the sub-
sequent reactions all these and other factors exacerbated the
tension and distrust amongst especially the three major eth-
nic groups in the country that contributed in no small way to
the collapse of the First Republic. Indeed the so-called
42. The civil war that ensued after all peace negotiations failed, ended on January
12, 1970, with the surrender of the Biafran army. General Gowon, at the secession of
hostilities, announced "a no victor, no vanquished" and promised to reconcile, recon-
struct, and rehabilitate the nation. Not much has been achieved in this regard, hence
the cry of marginalization by the Igbo for going into war against the rest of the country.
43. Why We Fought Civil War-Gowon, THISDAY NEWS, Sept. 4, 2001, available at
http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2001/09/04/20010904newsO3.html.
44. Id. War and Ethnicity: Global Connection and Local Violence (David Turton ed.,
1997), examined the causes of internal war, the techniques used by nationalist politi-
cians and intellectuals to turn ethnicity into a powerful political resource, and the re-
sponse of the U.N. and of nongovernmental agencies.
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'young Turks', Nzegwu and co. used this as their rational for
staging the January 1966 coup.
45
Since the end of the civil war in 1970, nine military coups
have taken place in Nigeria. While four succeeded and effec-
tively ran governments, the rest failed due to timely intervention
by the government in power to foil those attempting overthrow
by force.46
The sudden demise of General Sani Abacha on June 8,
1998, paved the way for a return to democracy in Nigeria. Gen-
eral Abdusalami Abubakar, who succeeded the late dictator, put
a transition program in place, which was pragmatically executed
resulting in democratically elected president and return to dem-
ocratic regime. Thus, the era of militarism came to an end on
May 29, 1999, when Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, was inaugurated
as the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
One of the steps taken by General Abubakar upon assuming
leadership was to produce a new constitution for Nigeria. In the
end of the process, the 1979 Constitution was adopted, with
slight changes, as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999. As a result of the return to democracy, Nigeria's
45. Why We Fought Civil War-Gowon, supra note 43.
46. Of the foiled coup attempts, the one that had the most ethnic/sectional under-
tone was the April 22, 1990 coup by Major Gideon Orkar, as was evident in his coup
broadcast to the nation:
Fellow Nigerian citizens, on behalf of the patriotic and well meaning peo-
ples of the Middle Belt and Southern parts of this country, I, Major Gideon
Gwarzo Orkar, wish to happily inform you of the'successful ousting of the
dictatorial, corrupt, drug-baronish, inhuman, sadistic, deceitful, homosexu-
ally-centered, oligaristic and un-patriotic administration of General Ibrahim
Badamosi Babangida.
We have equally commenced their trials for unabated corruption, mis-
management of nation's economy, the murders of Dele Giwa, Major-General
M.J. Vatsa and other officers as theirs was not an attempted coup, but mere
intentions that were yet to materialize and other human rights violations ....
The disgraceful and inexplicable removal of Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe,
Professor Tam David-West, Mr. Aret Adams and so on ....
In the light of all the above and in recognition of the negativeness (sic) of
the aforementioned aristocratic factor, the overall progress of the Nigerian
States, a temporary decision to excise the following states namely: Sokoto,
Borno, Katsina, Kano and Bauchi States from the Federal Republic of Nigeria
comes into effect immediately ....
Gideon Orkar's Memorial Speech, Apr. 1990, available in AKINNOLA, supra note 30, at
41-45. Unlike the previous coup broadcasts which sought to unite Nigerians byjustifying
their actions on points of national interest, this coup emphasized the division of Nigeria
by excising five of the component States in the federation.
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political history changed, but has combined a new political prob-
lem with pre-existing socio-economic, cultural, religious, and
ethnic ones. With democracy in place, it is hoped that the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of the citizenry as en-
trenched in the Constitution shall guide governmental actions
for the benefit of all and for the continued unity and good gov-
ernance in Nigeria.
The efforts of President Olusegun Obasanjo in his two-year
old administration have put the country back into its rightful
place in the comity of nations.47 However, while a lot has been
achieved, much more remains to be addressed, particularly, the
issue of the unity of the nation. The re-integration of the Igbo,
as well as other ethnic groups and zones, whose interests are not
fully addressed at the center, should not be taken for granted.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Upon attainment of independence former colonies in Af-
rica set themselves up as passionate defenders of human rights.
Their various constitutions contained fairly elaborate chapters
on human rights and fundamental freedoms thereby making
these rights positive law enforceable in the courts.48 Stressing
the importance of this development, the late Sir Tafawa Balewa
said "[w] e felt that this was a subject of such tremendous impor-
tance that the human rights should not be left hidden here and
there in a legal maze, and we insisted on having a special chapter
of our constitution devoted to the exposition of those funda-
mental human rights. '49
All past and present Nigerian constitutions contain constitu-
tional guarantees necessary for the unity and progress of the
country, and peaceful co-existence of the various ethnic nations
47. The return to democracy has enhanced the re-integration of Nigeria into the
international community. The prolonged military dictatorships in Nigeria, and espe-
cially the regime of late General Sani Abacha with its unprecedented record of human
rights violations caused many countries to sever relations with Nigeria, the most felt
being the Commonwealth of Nations. Travel restrictions and economic embargoes
were placed on Nigeria, and innocent Nigerians intending to travel abroad were sub-
jected to inhuman and degrading treatments in the hands of some foreign consulates
and entry ports in some countries.
48. OSITA EZE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: SOME SELECTED PROBLEMS 23 (1984).
49. The first Prime Minister of Nigeria at an African Conference on the Rule of
Law, held in Lagos in 1961. This view was reflected in the Republican Constitution of
1963 (Chapter III) and embodied in all subsequent Nigerian constitutions.
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that the country is composed of. The recitals of the 1999 Consti-
tution, adapted to that of 1979, provides:
We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria having
firmly and solemnly Resolve, to live in unity and harmony as
one indivisible and indissoluble Sovereign nation under God,
dedicated to the promotion of inter-African Solidarity, world
peace, international cooperation and understanding, and to
provide for a Constitution for all purpose of promoting the
good government and welfare of all persons in our country,
on the principles of freedom, equality and justice, and for the
purpose of consolidating the unity of our people ....
But for a few additions, some of which are cosmetic rather
than substantive, both the 1979 and 1999 constitutions are simi-
lar in their respective provisions and both aim at creating a fed-
eral constitution with a strong center. 5' Although both constitu-
tions were modeled after the Constitution of the United States,
there is a remarkable point of difference in the coinage of the
recitals to the latter. The U.S. Constitution starts by proclaiming
that "the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect union .... ,51 The wording of the U.S. Constitution
bears testimony to a systematic and voluntary nature of unifica-
tion of the component States with the constitutional recognition
and acceptability for the individuality of each State.53 The Niger-
ian Constitution talked more of the indissolubility and indivisi-
bility of the nation, even though each unit or State was originally
carved out from one or more of the composing States. 54 Profes-
sor Abiola Ojo explains that such recitals contained in the Niger-
ian Constitutions were cynical. The truth, according to him was
that "the military government made, enacted and gave the peo-
50. NIG. CONST. (1999) pmbl.
51. See Chief Afe Babalola, The 1979 and 1999 Constitutions: A Comparative Analysis,
NIr. TRIB., June 7, 1999.
52. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
53. Nevertheless, the legal worthlessness or artificiality of recitals to the U.S. Con-
stitution's Preamble was stated by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States of America in Jacobson v. Massachusetts. In that case it was held that "[a]lthough
[the] Preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and es-
tablished the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive
power conferred on the Government of the United States or on any of its Depart-
ments." 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
54. Babalola, supra note 51, at 7.
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ple of Nigeria the constitution. ' 55 This point is further rein-
forced by the fact that the Supreme Military Council ("SMC")
took it upon itself to modify what was submitted to it by the Con-
stituent Assembly. Aside from being undemocratic and arbi-
trary, the constitution was, particularly by this act, robbed of its
autochthonous character as being a prioduct of the will of the
people of Nigeria. 56
An overview of the pre-independence constitutional devel-
opment of Nigeria revealed a common feature of all the colonial
constitutions. None was designed to build a strong nation. Al-
though the pre-independence constitutions created a defective
political framework for Nigeria, it is my view that post-indepen-
dence constitutional efforts by Nigerians at constitution making
have, to a reasonable extent, covered vital aspects of the histori-
cal antecedents of the nation. The problem lies squarely with
the implementation of the constitution, not necessarily with its
content. In a well-established democratic regime, the constitu-
tion is subject to amendments. According to human rights
crusader, Chief Gani Fawehinmi:
"[t] here was nothing wrong with the 1979 constitution. Our
problem is the caliber of the operators, who were vampire. I
have read the constitution. I have practiced it. I have gone to
court with it. The problems attributed to the constitution are
imaginary. If you give a good constitution to a rogue to oper-
ate, he will destroy it .... ,57
While it seems suspect that the majority of the post-indepen-
dence constitutions in Nigeria were the products of military re-
gimes, this fact does not delegitimize these texts. The wisdom
and vision exhibited in the making of Nigeria's recent constitu-
55. See Femi Adaramoye, Revisiting the 1999 Constitution, NIG. GUARDIAN, June 22,
1999, at 7.
56. Id.
57. Gani Fawehinmi, (Interview) NEWSWATCH, Sept. 21, 1987. It is pertinent to
observe here that constitutionalism is distinct from the on-going agitation in some cir-
cles in Nigeria for a Sovereign National Conference ("SNC"). Proponents of the SNC
argue that it would afford Nigerians the opportunity to discuss fundamental issues that
touch on the sovereignty and unity of the nation-State. It is their belief that the na-
tional question cannot be wished away. Of course, it cannot be resolved over night to
everyone's satisfaction. But it can be managed sensitively and imaginatively to mitigate
the bitterness and deep-rooted complaints of several nationalities within the Nigerian
fold. Ultimately, the outcome of any eventual SNC may lead to fundamental changes in
the present federal constitution.
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tions are better understood by reference to the 1979 constitu-
tional text, with particular reference to areas and issues that di-
rectly relate to, or through which ethnic consciousness often de-
rive. On this premise, the provisions of the 1979 Constitution
relating to the fundamental objectives and directive principles of
State policy, are noteworthy.
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any
of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried
out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of
Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to
command national unity, thereby ensuring that there shall be
no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few
ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in
any of its agencies.
5 8
Furthermore, article 15(2) provides "accordingly, national inte-
gration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on
the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or
linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited." 5 ' But despite
these eloquent constitutional and other legal and administrative
provisions, events in the country leave much to be desired. Dr.
Femi Ajayi succinctly put it thus:
The civil war ended about three decades ago, the three Rs of
Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation recom-
mended by my good friend, Dr. Yakubu Gowon [are] not
fully implemented yet. I wonder how long this would take
Nigeria Government to do. The Igbos, Isokos, Okrikas, every
one is crying marginalization, from Port Harcourt through
Sokoto to Maiduguri. I am being marginalized because of my
name, my religion, my height, my size, my voice, my educa-
tion .... If Nigerians are not exposed to the truth, about the
atrocities of the past years of misrule, how can we reconcile
Nigerians and relate among ourselves as brothers and sis-
ters.... If we do not hear from those that polarized Nigeri-
ans, how do we want to have [the] true federalism that we are
all yearning for?6"
58. NIG. CONST. Ch. II, art. 14(3) (1979).
59. Id. art. 15(2) (1979).
60. Dr. Femi Ajayi, The Oputa Commission and the Generals, NIGERIAWORLD, Aug. 17,
2001, available at http://www.nigeriaworld.com/columnist/ajayi/081701.html. The
Oputa Commission on Human Rights Violations was set up by the Obasanjo administra-
tion to investigate cases of human right abuses during the past military regimes in the
country.
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Although there are many human rights provisions in the
1979 and 1999 Nigerian constitutions, certain crucial rights are
frequently abused. These include the right to freedom of ex-
pression and press,61 the right to peaceful assembly and associa-
tion,6 2 and the right to freedom from discrimination.6" These
rights and fundamental freedoms are suppressed through harsh
laws, decrees, and edicts that curb and restrain their enjoyment.
(1) A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic
group, place of origin, sex, religion, or political opinion
shall not, by reason only that he is such a person:
(a) be subjected either expressly by or in the practical
application of, any law in force in Nigeria or any ex-
ecutive or administrative action of the government to
disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria
of other communities, ethnic groups, place of origin,
sex, religions, or political opinions, are not made
subject, or,
(b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical
application of, law in force in Nigeria or any execu-
tive or administrative action, any privilege or advan-
tage that is not accorded to citizens of Nigeria of
other communities, ethnic group, places of origin,
sex, religions or political opinion.
(2) No citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability
or deprivation merely by reason of the circumstances of
his birth.
(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) of this section shall invalidate
any law by reason only that the law imposes restrictions
with respect to the appointment of any person to any of-
fice under the state or as a member of the armed forces
of the Federation or a member of the Nigeria Police
Force or to an office in the service of a body corporate
established directly by law in force in Nigeria. 64
This section of the Constitution is the most abused by the
government of the Federation and its agencies. Discrimination
against certain ethnic groups are committed in all sectors of na-
tional endeavor including, inter alia, employment; promotion;
education, especially with regard to admission and financial as-
61. NIG. CONST. art. 39 (1999).
62. Id. art. 40.
63. Id. art. 42.
64. Id.
2001] ISSUES ON ETHNICITY AND GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 457
sistance to indigent students; and appointments to strategic mili-
tary and civil responsibilities, police, and political offices. Se-
lected ethnic nationals within the Federation take all the con-
tracts that government awards, because their friends and family
happen to occupy strategic positions in government and govern-
ment owned corporations.
Injustice has resulted from this state of affairs, and a num-
ber of disfavored ethnic groups are crying out for redress. Prom-
inent among these groups are the Igbo, whose marginalization
in Nigeria has been overtly acknowledged, even by the marginal-
izers themselves.
IV. MARGINALIZATION 65
A. Intolerance In Nigeria: Old or New Phobia?
The plight of the Igbo ethnic group in Nigeria was aptly
65. The term "marginalization" has gained topicality in the discourse about the
plight of some ethnic groups in Nigeria, particularly the Igbo. I have used it in that
sense here, for the risk of being misunderstood. This is because I have some
reservations about its adequacy in describing the present plight of the Igbo. The Igbo
have, between 1970 and present, gone through the following stages: Identification,
Marginalization, Vilification, and what they are experiencing presently is the
Criminalization stage. The last stage will be eventual Persecution. The first of these
stages occurred during the events that led to the civil war. The monetary and other
policies of the Federal government on the defeated Biafra (e.g: the awarding of twenty
pounds sterling to each household in exchange for whatever was the worth of such
household's bank account) amounted to Marginalization. One definition of
marginalize is to "make or treat as insignificant ...." which is not true of the Igbo's
plight in present day Nigeria. OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 607
(1999). A marginalized group is systematically excluded, or not fully involved, in the
distribution, options, resources, and possibilities offered by societies and economies.
Poverty, therefore, usually accompanies marginalization. Both poverty and
marginalization are not incidental phenomena, but are structurally related to the way
economic and social systems function. That is, systems of production, labor use, and
distribution have embedded within them mechanisms that lead to poverty and
marginalization. There are a variety of reasons for this: the low productivity or poor
organization of labor, because of the ways in which the benefits of production are
shared, and because of institutions or patterns of organization of production which
limit access or marginalize groups who lack certain characteristics or abilities.
Economically, the Igbo are doing well and are not denied their federal allocations and
other benefits. The Criminalization stage stems from the fact the Igbo are adjudged
guilty of their failed secession bid. This justifies the postulation that the Igbo are
subjected to political exclusion in Nigeria today, short of being sent to jail en masse.
Therefore, criminalization automatically implies exclusion. This explains the reason
that no Igboman is considered for a meaningful position in the armed forces, police, or
in any of the numerous national security agencies. That candidates of Igbo ethnic
origin seeking admission into tertiary institutions are denied admission despite their
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described in an interview by Chief Alex Akinyele, who was
charged with the responsibility of national reconciliation under
the dictatorship of late General Abacha:
The question you asked me has been engaging my mind
within the last few years. On March 10, 1998, at Enugu State
House of Assembly, at a seminar organized by the national
reconciliation committee, I was opportuned (sic) to hear the
general view of Ndigbo on the issue of marginalization. On
that occasion, Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu spoke for the entire
Ndigbo. After that, Dr. Alex Ekwueme made the conclusion.
There was no news of political, economic and institutional
consequence, that was not there. I listened attentively. Now,
Ndigbo have cried out again and I think they have a point. I
think that Ndigbo is marginalized. In my position as chair-
man of the national reconciliation committee, I went to all
five states of Ndigbo and their complaints were a chorus of
marginalization. The question of Igbo marginalization did
not start today. It started with the war of 1967 or whatever led
to the civil war .... They should have been rehabilitated in
the armed forces and police forces .... But you don't blame
Obasanjo for Igbo marginalisation. It started from the time
of Gowon to that of Murtala Mohammed.... I want to advise
that Ndigbo should give President Obasanjo time to right all
the wrongs done to them.... But I must also add that there
are so many marginalised groups in Nigeria but the case of
Ndigbo is too obvious. They are more marginalized than the
others .... 66
high scores, while those from the North or other so-called backward states are
considered even with lesser grades, is not marginalization. And again, in applying the
term marginalization, it is necessary to draw a line as to who it effects more negatively
than others, the masses or the politicians, hence it becomes worthwhile to clearly define
the term before its analytical value is exploited. The loose manner in which its use has
become fashionable in various discursive platforms in the country seems out of context
with the practical political reality of Nigeria. Although the Igbo were instrumental in
forming the PDP, the party currently in power, they are no longer in control of that
party. The rest of Nigeria does not regard the Igbo as insignificant. Rather, it sees the
Igboman as a genius, whose know-how and stature are better avoided for fear of a
reenactment of the days prior to Biafra. Certain utterances by some prominent
Nigerians, some of which I have quoted in this paper, go a long way to supporting the
Exclusion theory.
66. Chief Alex Akinyele, VANGUARD NEWSPAPER, Interview, Oct. 25, 1999. Convinc-
ing as the above sentiments may sound, one wonders why during the many years the
respected Chief was the chairman of the reconciliation committee nothing, even a
Memo, was not raised which addressed the marginalization of Igbo. Furthermore, he
failed to justify his exoneration of General Obasanjo's regime that succeeded Murtala
Muhammed's, and eventually handed over to Shagari in 1979. Is he playing on the
[Vol. 25:431
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The relevance of the above statement to this project is to show
that an ethnic problem actually exists in Nigeria, which may be
termed "Igbo-phobia."6 The Igbo have heard and had enough
of such rhetoric. All that the Igbo deserve is a practical action
geared toward bridging the gap in the power equation that will
lead to a policy of inclusion of the Igbo. The marginalization
chorus has been over labored and the slogan must change in a
positive direction, indicating the initiatives taken by Ndigbo to-
ward their reintegration into the mainstream of national politics.
B. The Aftermath of the Civil War
The defeat, and the stigma resulting from the loss of the
Biafra civil war are the main factors that facilitated the incidence
of exclusion or marginalization of the Igbo from the mainstream
political and economic activities in Nigeria. At the end of the
British colonization, the Igbo dominated Nigeria's economic ac-
tivities, thereby exercising indigenous colonialism. They were
instrumental in the development of almost all the major cities in
Nigeria, including Lagos, Kano, Port Harcourt, and Calabar.68
These cities are the most boisterous of modern Nigeria and are
all located outside the realm of Igboland. On the national stage,
the Igbo commitment to building a strong and indivisible feder-
ation was uncontestable.69
The Igbo decision to secede was a direct consequence of the
inability of the federal government of the time to guarantee the
intelligence of Ndigbo? Or, are Ndigbo so naive and/or ignorant of Nigeria's historical
antecedents and political dynamics?
67. It may not be off the point to suggest that either the Chief was in search of a
job, or expressing guilty conscience in disguise, considering the fact that his press con-
ference coincided with an official visit he paid the incumbent, President Obasanjo, at
the seat of power at Abuja.
68. See, e.g., Ene, supra note 37, at 20; Chike E. Okafor, Igbo Marginalization: Time to
Look Within, NIGERIAWORLD, Oct. 27, 1999.
69. This viewpoint is well grounded in historical antecedents. In the footsteps of
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (first president of the federation), Dr. Michael Okpara, Chief De-
nis Osadebey, Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe, Dr. Akanu Ibiam, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, Chiefs
Muokwugo Okoye, Z.C. Obi, R.B.K. Okafor, Mazi Mbonu Ojike. Dr. Ben. 0. Nzeribe,
M.C.K. Ajuluchukwu, among others, were in the forefront of the nationalist struggle for
self-rule. As a major component of the Nigerian society, the Igbo played significant
roles in the post-colonial armed forces, federal bureaucracy, academia, and the estab-
lishment of indigenously controlled commercial network across the country. Such a
position may have contributed to the envious hostility that energized the 1966-67 geno-
cidal internal armed hostilities that cost millions of lives.
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safety of their lives and property. 70 As a result, the Igbo have
been marginalized and this state of affairs has continued to af-
fect the nation's foundation. It has assumed the dimension of
faits accomplis and no solutions seem to be in sight.
Igbo marginalization has been far-reaching. In the armed
forces the highest rank any Igboman has ever attained since the
end of hostilities was Brigadier-General or its equivalent in other
branches of the armed forces. In the police force, an Igboman
has never been appointed the Inspector-General of Police for
the country. Very brilliant Igbo officers in the uniformed orga-
nizations in Nigeria end up in the classrooms, teaching or in-
structing young recruits. No Igboman heads any of the nation's
thirty-six state police commands in the rank of Police Commis-
sioner. The few "lucky" ones who managed to wear that rank are
best considered as Commandants of police colleges and such
other less important, less strategic, or insignificant deployments.
The nation's security services outfits are a 'no go' areas for Igbo.
This policy of exclusion serves to ensure and perpetuate what is
widely termed the Igbo marginalization in Nigeria.
The human problems associated with the denial or lack of
opportunity for an individual or group to participate in the run-
ning of state affairs are enormous. It causes a feeling of frustra-
tion, neglect, and alienation from the economic and social sys-
tem as well as a lack of professional fulfillment. Furthermore, if
the alienation becomes large-scale, it may cause social unrest
and crime, and a general unwillingness for those affected to of-
fer their necessary support to the political system. Consequently,
such a situation can lead to social injustice and inequality, and
constitutes a denial of the fundamental rights of citizens to en-
gage in gainful employment or exercise of their professions.
C. Igbophobism
The first step in the progression toward persecution of per-
sons is identification." The Igbo have been identified, largely a
result of the Biafran misadventure. The Igbo have been the
70. See Okenwa Nwosu, Strategic Interest of the Igbos in the New Millennium, NIGER-
IAWORLO, Oct. 13, 1999, available at http://www.nigeriaworld.com/feature/pubica-
tion/nwosu/igbo-millennium.html.
71. The Politics of Hate, available at http://www.jeremiahproject.com/prophecy/
warxian3.html.
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targets of numerous hostile attitudes from the majority of their
fellow citizens. Igbo all over the country lost everything to the
war. At the end of the same war, their property, including
houses and other landed properties were either seized or confis-
cated, not only by ordinary citizens, but in most instances, by
some local government agencies on whose territories such
properties were located. It was so in Port Harcourt, Calabar,
Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Lagos, and Ibadan. Those Igbo who survived
the civil war, hoping to rehabilitate themselves, were instead
dragged into a marathon of court litigations in their bid to re-
cover and repossess what became known then as "abandoned
property." Others, less fortunate, faced jungle justice and did
not live to tell the story. The war continued. To many Igbo, the
war is still raging on.
After the war ended in 1970, systematic disenfranchisement
of the Igbo was put in place. The post-civil war national politics
were in many respects predicated on an unspoken tacit agree-
ment by certain interest groups to regard the marginalization of
the Igbo as an essential ingredient for fashioning their vision of
a post-war Nigeria.
In retrospect, the activities of the federal government
against the Igbo might have seemed necessary in order to deal
with the prevailing circumstances of the time. But the non-im-
plementation of the Reconciliation, Reconstruction, and Reha-
bilitation policies announced by General Yakubu Gowon after
the war ended in 1970, may have given impetus to the post civil
war injustices and acts directed at the Igbo ethnic group. The
Igbophobic tendencies of the ruling class in Nigeria show the
extent of ethnic biases in the country.7 2
In 1990, General Olusegun Obasanjo, was quoted as having
made the following remarks:
Any word, deed or act that would lead to disaffection and
Biafranization of Nigeria, on whatever pretence, excuse or
pretext stands condemned and all perpetrators regarded as
72. Umaru Dikko, erstwhile Federal Minister under Shagari's regime (1979-1983)
once "threatened the South-west about what happened to the Igbos in 1966," appar-
ently referring to the pogrom, looting, arson, and vandalizing of the Igbo in the North-
ern part of the country, and civil war that completed the designed genocide committed
against the Igbo nation. In a similar vein, another front line politician from the North,
Abubakar Umar, once remarked that "Nigerians are not yet ready for an Igbo Presi-
dent."
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public enemy number one and fought as such.73
The name, Biafra, no doubt means a lot to President Obasanjo.
As Gbenga Aroyehun rightly observed:
The Biafra war will continue to loom large in the conscious-
ness of Mr. President because the war made him what he is
today. He is a soldier, a writer, a politician, a statesman, an
international figure, all because of the Biafra war. He distin-
guished himself in that war when he headed the 3rd Marine
Commando, he had the singular honour of receiving the in-
strument of surrender from General Effiong. His account of
the war in his 'My Command' has made him a writer. He
became the Head of State and now Mr. President, both he
owes to the war and his unflinching belief in the unity of Ni-
geria. 7
4
Nigeria does not want the Igbo to come close, and at the same
time it does not want them to go away. In the Igbo cosmology,
writes Dr. Afulezi, "there is a saying: Do you kill a man and stand
in the way of his going to the spirit world?"7
At a public lecture in Lagos, Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu re-
marked:
The Tivs were in open revolt right from the dawn of indepen-
dence, the West joined in this revolt in the fourth year of in-
dependence, Isaac Adaka Boro proclaimed his republic in the
next year. Between 1966-1967 came the massacres of Igbo in
the North of Nigeria. One fascinating aspect of all this chaos
was that Nigeria only went to war against Ndigbo. The Tiv
riots provoked police action and the rebel leader, Joseph
Tarka eventually became a national hero. In the West the
Action Group which was rebellious was led by Chief Obafemi
Awolowo, he too became a national hero. In the Rivers area,
Isaac Adaka Boro became a national hero. I have often won-
dered why in respect of the Igbo resistance it became neces-
73. AFRICAN CONCORD, May 28, 1990. The statement was allegedly made at the
launching of a book entitled Nigeria Since Independence: The First 25 Years, in Lagos,
Nigeria. Although the General was quoted to have made the above remark, his orders
to the army and police since becoming President in 1999 have been to wipe out the
whole Odi community for demanding their reasonable share or be allowed to control
the resources in their land. Similar orders were given to the security agents to shoot-on-
sight any member of the pan-Yoruba militia outfit, the O'odua People's Congress
("OPC").
74. Gbenga Aroyehun, Obasanjo's Obsession with Biafra, Sept. 20, 2001, at http://
www.allafrica.com/stories/200109200442.html.
75. Dr. U.N. Afulezi, The Igbo in Catch 22 Situation, NICERIAWORLD, June 16, 2000.
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sary to seek the final solution-why this double standard? ...
[T] he Nigeria odyssey of Ndigbo, their journey from slavery,
through colonialism to independence, their journey through
crisis to crisis, into war into crisis again has been a route-
match through the fields of Golgotha.76
Nigeria is probably the only country that fought a war and
went about wiping away the relics of its legacy. In the process,
the victor smoothly and steadfastly kept the vanquished down
and out of nation-building efforts.77
D. Federal Character in Education and the Igbo
The Constitution of Nigeria reflects the composition of the
government of the federation or its agencies and enjoins that
the conduct of the affairs of government must be carried out in
such a way as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the
need to promote all the peoples of the federation. 7' The opera-
tive expression here is "federal character." This is defined as:
[t]he distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote
national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of
Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation as expressed in
section 14(3) and (4) of this constitution. 79
The federal character expression was also designed to ensure
that Nigerian citizens have the opportunity to participate in the
affairs of the nation. Accordingly, federal character expression
seeks to ensure that there will be no predominance of persons
from any few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional
groups in any government of the federation or in any of its agen-
cies.
The rights to freedom from discriminatory treatment on
grounds of place or ethnic or linguistic association is a necessity
for national integration, particularly when both the heterogene-
76. Chief Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Nigeria: The Truths Which Are Self-Evi-
dent, Address at the TSM 2nd Diamond Lecture to Mark the Fourth Anniversary of the
Magazine (Feb. 22, 1994).
77. M.O. Ene, Biafta Lives, NIGERIAWORLD, Letters and Viewpoints, May 30, 2000.
78. NiG. CONST. art. 14 (1999).
79. Id. art. 318. The fallout from the divisive tendencies of the federal character
issue include the bi-polar perception of most national issues, the fierce competition
among the three major ethnic groups for political and economic advantage mostly at
the expense of the other multifarious groups, the Muslim-Christian dichotomy, and the
all-inclusive indigene politics of keeping out "non-indigenes" from their individual
turfs.
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ity of the Nigerian society and the human tendency to place his
sectional interest above his national interest are considered. It is
against the background of this constitutional provisions coupled
with the numerous international treaties to which Nigeria is
party, that one wonders what constitutes the basis of what I chose
to call a "Xenophobic-Igbophobism," by which I mean to suggest
that the Igbo are not only considered 'external,' but also 'de-
spised' in Nigeria. The notion of federal character is applied in
the most negative form vis-d-vis the Igbo. This state of affairs is
most noticeable in the areas of education, employment, location
of government projects, and environmental policy. However, my
focus here is on education considering its importance in the
building of the minds of the youth toward good citizenship.
Nigeria's Policy on education is "constitutionally guaran-
teed."8" In principle, the nation's educational objective is based
on the integration of the individual into a sound and effective
citizen through equal education opportunities for all citizens of
the nation at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, both in-
side and outside the formal school system. Accordingly, the
Constitution enjoins the government to direct its policy towards
ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational oppor-
tunities at all levels," and further that "Government shall strive
to eradicate illiteracy; and to this end, Government shall as and
when practicable provide (a) free, compulsory and universal pri-
mary education, (b) free secondary education, (c) free university
education, and (d) free adult literacy program. '"82
Education is a principal channel of culture. The UDHR
recognized the importance of education when it proclaimed
that: "everyone has the right to education, and that education
shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages." 3 It follows that the education policy of Nigeria is in tan-
dem with the universally accepted standard, which recognizes
education as a fundamental right of every person.
80. NIG. CONST. art. 18 (1999). Various National Policies of Education in the past
were not applied religiously as each succeeding regime went about education its own
way. It is, however noteworthy and commendable that such policies are now built into
the federal constitution. See, e.g., NATIONAL POLICIES OF EDUCATION (1977) (on file with
author); NERC Press, Yaba, Lagos (1981) (on file with author).
81. NIG. CONST. art. 18 (1999).
82. Id.
83. UDHR, supra note 1, art. 26.
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The reality in Nigeria does not live up to these standards.
Unequal distribution of educational facilities and materials is an
abuse of the rights of those disfavored by such act or cautious
omission to do what is right. The discriminatory admission pol-
icy of government, from an objective standpoint, disfavors candi-
dates of the Igbo origin. Because of their numerical strength
and performance in the competitive admission tests for univer-
sity and college admissions, a large number of them are dropped
to make space for less qualified candidates from other areas.
Other abusive criteria include the "Local Government," and "Ed-
ucationally Disadvantaged State." In the end, candidates from
other states take up all available places in the Igbo area institu-
tions. While being already considered educationally advanced,
the Igbo are left with few openings based on merit. The conse-
quence of this is mass withdrawal from attempting the qualifying
examinations and from school for the most of Igbo youths.
The unfortunate aspects of this practice is aptly summarized
by Senator A. Wabara:
I feel ashamed when I hear Nigerians say that Igbos are very
enterprising. What is enterprising about a race which 95 per
cent of its youths are hawking on the streets of all the towns
in Nigeria and abroad. The result of this . . . is that in the
next 50 years, there may be no Igbo graduates. The Igbo race
will be a bunch of moneybags and of illiterates. Then the
marginalisation design and government neglect would have
been accomplished 4
V. SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE BIAFRA EXPERIENCE
Self-determination has evolved through the years to mean
different things to different people depending on their political
inclination or orientation. To a colonized or dependent terri-
tory, it means the right to determine without external interfer-
ence their political status. To such people, self-determination is
their right to sovereign independence.
On the other hand, to a people within a sovereign indepen-
dent State, self-determination includes their right to participate
fully in the main political process of the sovereign State in which
their cultural heritage and social and economic identities are
84. Why the Igbos Must Rethink, POST ExPREss, Oct. 11, 1999, available at http://
www.postexpresswired.com.
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recognized and allowed to develop without being unreasonably
stultified by the official policy of the State. To those people, the
concept of self-determination ensures that every group with a le-
gitimate interest: geographical, national, traditional, cultural, or
any other kind, enjoys full democratic rights.85 The concept of
self-determination has over the years been accepted as a funda-
mental human right recognized by international customary
law. 86
However, the main controversy associated with the peoples'
rights to self-determination is the question of secession. Seces-
sion by a people, stricto sensu, is an expression of that peoples'
right to self-determination. It has been asserted, however, that
secession negates the principle of sovereign territories, which is
a fundamental principle of international law.
Nevertheless wars of secession have been fought, won or
lost, in many parts of the world in recent times. In other places,
the break-up of the hitherto sovereign entities such as the ex-
Soviet Union, former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and else-
where are predicated on the concept of self-determination.
The U.N. and other international agencies were swift to in-
tervene in the former Yugoslavia, establishing a civil administra-
tion under the authority of the United Nations Interim Adminis-
trative Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK").87 As with Nigeria between
1967-1970, ethnicity is the main issue in the crises in Bosnia.88
By any standard imaginable, the atrocities perpetrated against
Biafra by the federal troops were enough to attract a U.N.
Peacekeeping mission. However, U.N. Peacekeeping interven-
tions are yet to make a meaningful impact in Sub-Saharan Africa,
despite several violent wars that have occurred in that region of
the world.
85. The principle of self determination is founded on the liberalism of the seven-
teenth sentury, in particular, the American Revolution, see Bill of Rights 1776, and the
French Revolution, see Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 1789. See also U. 0.
UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 6 (1972).
86. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
87. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, YUGOSLAVIA, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACrICES, 2000 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/9/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2000/eur/mdex; S.C. Res. 1244, 4011th mtg., S/RES/1244 (1999) (recognizing
the continuing sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo, but call-
ing for 'substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration').
88. See Paul C. Szasz, The Quest for a Bosnian Constitution: Legal Aspects of the Constitu-
tional Proposals Relating to Bosnia, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 363, 407 (1995).
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For instance, in the 1960-61 crises in the Congo, the U.N.
refused to recognize the right of self-determination of the re-
source-rich Katanga province to secede presuming that the se-
cession would be disastrous to the remainder of the Congo.
89
Similarly, although the passionate demand of the people of Bi-
afra to self-determination was widely noted, the "Republic of Bi-
afra" had weak international support, presumably on the
grounds that it would be disastrous to the rest of Nigeria, and
beyond. The marginal ranking of Africa in the scale of interna-
tional priorities and, in particular, the polite indifference of the
international community in the Biafra cause, was unfortunate.
VI. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE BIAFRA
EXPERIENCE: 'JUS IN BELLO" OR
JUS AD BELL UM"?
The laws applicable in armed conflicts9" refer to interna-
tional rules established by treaty or custom, which are specifically
intended to solve humanitarian problems that arise directly from
international or non-international armed conflict. These rules
are aimed at protecting persons and property that are, or are
likely to be, affected by the conflict. It aims also to stall the war-
89. See G.A. Res. 1474, U.N. GAOR, 4th Emergency Session (ES-IV), U.N. Doc. A/
4510 (1960).
90. See Antoine A. Bouvier, International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed
Conflict, Lecture at The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR-
POCI); THE UNITED NATIONS 3 (Dr. HarveyJ. Langholtz ed., 2000). The need to pro-
tect lives and property during wars had existed as early as 1000 BC. Such prohibitions
can be found in many different civilizations throughout the world and throughout his-
tory. For example, in many parts of Africa there were specific rules regarding the com-
mencement of hostilities between different peoples that correspond to a large extent,
to the classical European traditional obligation of declaring war. In his famous title The
Art of War, Sun Tzu expressed the idea that wars must be limited to military necessity,
and that prisoners of war, wounded, sick, and civilians should be spared. In the Code of
Manu, written in 200 BC, rules can be found which relate to behavior in combat. The
Code declared that barbed or poisoned weapons were prohibited, that wounded
soldiers had to be cared for, and that surrendering combatants must be spared. These
examples of humanitarian customs in various civilizations demonstrate that even if the
Geneva or Hague Conventions were not universal at inception, since they were drafted
and adopted by lawyers and diplomats belonging to the European-Christian culture,
their sentiments are nearly universal, since the principles they contain can be found in
very different systems of thought, both European and non-European. The main goal of
international humanitarian law is to protect the individual victim from conflicts. The
first universal treaty on humanitarian law was the Geneva Convention of 1864.
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ring parties rights to choose their methods and means of war-
fare.
The distinction made between jus in bello and jus ad bellum
refers to the principle of international humanitarian law of
armed conflict which suggests that while some types of wars can
be justified in terms of self-defense (jus ad bellum: fighting a war
based on just cause), others can be regarded as being fought on
the basis of a right to wage a war (jus in bello: the principle of
fighting a war justly). According to Bouvier, "It] oday, however,
the use of force between states is prohibited by a peremptory
rule of international law and the jus ad belium has changed into a
jus contra bellum, except in cases of individual and collective self-
defense, Security Council enforcement measures, and arguably,
to enforce peoples' right to self-determination."" The efforts by
the international community to prohibit and discourage armed
conflicts have not yielded the desired result.
Governments are very often disposed to accept instruments
that are formally of a non-binding character, and in situations of
a non-international armed conflict, do not confer an interna-
tional legal right on the opposition.92 According to Baxter,
"[t]he first line of defense against international humanitarian
law is to deny that it applies at all.9 3
The war experience of the Igbo in Biafra and subsequent
91. Bouvier, supra note 90; see also U.N. CHARTER, supra note 1, art. 2(4) & chap.
VII. The legitimacy of the use of force to enforce the right of self-determination as
provided for in the U.N. Human Rights Covenants, has acquired recognition in interna-
tional law. As Skubiszewski observed "[I]n the relations between the government and
the governed the principle of self-determination and human rights and fundamental
freedoms can be vindicated through resort to physical force conducted by the latter
against the former .. " K. Skubiszewski, Use of Force by States. Collective Security. Law of
War and Neutrality, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 739, 771 (Max Sorensen
ed., 1968); see also Han-Peter Gasser, International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of
War Victims, Nov. 1, 1998, available at http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/5cacfdf48ca698b
641256242003b3295/ac0308be0f6b8217412561e300360910?OpenDocument; Yves San-
doz, The International Committee of the Red Cross As Guardian of International Humanitarian
Law, Mar. 1, 1998, available at http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/5cacfdf48ca698b
64125624 2003b 3295 / 2dbd0938774a 14f9412566170029ccb0? OpenDocument & High
light=2,Sandoz,Guardian.
92. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION 152 (1987).
93. Baxter, Some Existing Problems of Humanitarian Law, The Concept of Inter-
national Armed Conflict: Further Outlook, Proceedings of the International Sympo-
sium on Humanitarian Law (Brussels, 1974) (on file with author).
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marginalization may qualify as crimes against humanity.94 Fur-
94. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998). Article 7 of the Rome Statute, defines a crime against humanity as:
1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(e) Torture;
(f) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity;
(g) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as
defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(h) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(i) The crime of apartheid;
(j) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course
of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to
in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack;
(b) "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions
of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine,
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population;
(c) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes
the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in
persons, in particular women and children;
(d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other
coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present,
without grounds permitted under international law;
(e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the
custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture
shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in
or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
470 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:431
thermore, the Geneva Conventions of 1949,9" to which Nigeria is
a party, in its Additional Protocol relating to the protection of
victims of non-international armed conflicts, provides:
All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased
to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has
been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person,
honor and convictions and religious practices. They shall in
all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction.96
The provisions97 went further to prohibit collective punish-
ment,9 8 outrages upon personal dignity,99 humiliating and de-
grading treatment,00 and threats to commit any of the forego-
ing acts."'0
As already noted, the government of Nigeria was guilty of all
(f) "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of any population or carrying out other grave
violations of international law. This definition shall not in any
way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to
pregnancy;
(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the
identity of the group or collectivity;
(h) "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character
similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the
context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression
and domination by one racial group over any other racial group
or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that
regime;
(i) "Enforced disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention
or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing them from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.
Id. art. 7.
95. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, T.I.A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
96. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
June 8, 1977, at Part II, art. 4(1), 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
97. Id. art. 4(2).
98. Id. art. 4(2)(b).
99. Id. art. 4(2)(e).
100. Id.
101. Id. art. 4(2)(h).
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the above acts of inhumanity and genocide during the civil war.
Although the war ended over thirty-one years ago, the no "victor,
no vanquished" policy announced by the government, as well as
the promise of rehabilitating the victims of such atrocities com-
mitted during the war are yet to be translated into practice. In-
stead, a design to further perpetuate the experience of the war
years, this time in the form of marginalization, was put in place.
There are people in the present regime that played very key
roles in the period prior to, during, and after the civil war. Aside
from the incumbent President Obasanjo, whose roles have been
mentioned before,"°2 there is also the current Minister of De-
fense, General T. Y. Danjuma (Rtd.). As the Commander in
charge of the State House at Ibadan in July, 1966, he was instru-
mental in the arrest and assassination of Major-General J.T.U.
Aguiyi-Ironsi, the Head of State together with his host, the Mili-
tary Administrator of the region, while on an official visit to the
Western region. True to their words, the Nigerian government
utilized all available "weapons" of mass destruction, including
"hunger," through land, air, and sea blockades. 10 3
The present regime is in a position to find a lasting solution
to most of Nigeria's political problems because of President
Olusegun Obasanjo's first hand knowledge of the causes of the
102. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
103. This violates art. 18(2) of the Additional Protocol (Protocol II), supra note 96,
even though the act preceded this provision. But the circumstance in question had
been regulated elsewhere, for example, in articles 5 and 30 of the UDHR, supra note 1.
Furthermore, the threat and the execution thereof are tantamount to genocide. In
defining genocide, there are three essential elements, namely: (i) an identifiable na-
tional, ethnical, racial, or religious group; (ii) the intent to destroy such a group in
whole or in part (mens rea); and (iii) the commission of any of the listed acts in conjunc-
tion with the identifiable group (actus reus). Genocide requires that acts be perpetrated
against a group with an aggravated criminal intent, namely, that of destroying the
group in whole or in part. The degree to which the group was destroyed in whole or in
part is not necessary to conclude that genocide has occurred. That one of the acts
enumerated in the definition was perpetrated with a specific intent suffices. Short of
being a civil war tribunal, the present effort by the President Obasanjo led-government,
is commendable, if as was reported, it covers the period from 1966-1970 and the post-
war period 1971-1998. Regrettably though, it does not seem that adequate responses
are forthcoming from the most adversely affected by the war. It would have been
proper to set up a special Commission to investigate the atrocities committed during
the war years and effort made to, at least, reconcile the nation. The current Justice
Chukwudifu Oputa led-Human Rights Violation Review Committee is not adequate
considering its basis, scope, and time factor, to be able to uncover all the misdeed of
the war era. It is even doubtful if it will be able, under the prevailing circumstances, to
properly investigate the violations of the post-civil war dictatorships in Nigeria.
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problems in the first place. There is need for a total reconcilia-
tion and the adoption of a national politics of inclusion and de-
marginalization of the marginalized ethnic groups.
Unfortunately, the refusal of the past military rulers of Nige-
ria to appear before the Human Rights Violations Review Com-
mittee ("HRVRC") to give account of their "stewardship" is not
enhancing any attempt at reconciling the nation. If the interna-
tional community had met its obligations to Nigeria, the recalci-
trant ex-dictators would have been taken to the International
Court of Justice at The Hague,just the way Slobodan Milosovic is
a guest there. Perhaps, and more appropriately, if Biafra had
attracted enough sympathy from the world community, the
atrocities of that era would have been adequate to talk of in
terms of a war crime tribunal. °4
In a body numbing, essay, Dele Sobowale noted:
[I]n 1967 and even now, Igbos have got a raw deal from the
Nigerian State. Every MASSOB member or sympathizer,
every cry for Igbo presidency re-echoes the experience of the
civil war and the resentment against those who got away with
genocide. Deep in their hearts, Igbo people yearn for an-
other Ojukwu to rise up and say "never again." For non-Igbo,
Ojukwu is one commander I would gladly have followed to
war because his cause was just.10 5
Indeed, for Ndigbo, it was a jus ad bellum. Regardless of the pre-
sent provocation, caution is still the best option. As Elsie
Onubogu, succinctly observed, "[t[he dead weight of our past
must be lifted. True healing, genuine conciliation, forgiveness,
will assist us to respect our individualism, diversity and human
dignity.""0 6
104. See Sonja Boelaert-Suominen, The International Criminal 7ibunal for the former
Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Conflict, INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, no. 837, at 217-52 (Mar.
31 2000), available at www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf. The disintegration of the former Yugo-
slavia began when Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence on June 25,
1991. See also James A. Burger, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crises:
Lessons Learned or to be Learned, available at www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf. Unlike the interna-
tional military tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, which were established after the
defeat and surrender of the Axis countries, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") was set up in 1993, at a time when the conflict was still on-
going.
105. Dele Sobowale, Emeka Ojukwu-Eze Ndigbo, VANGUARD NEWSPAPER, Apr. 15,
2001, cited by Okechukwu E. Asia, Dim [Chiefi Chukwuemeka Odimegwu (sic) Ojukwu: The
Real Soldier and Eze Igbo Gburu Gburu, NIGERIAWORLD, July 12, 2001.
106. Elsie Onubogu, The Path to Nation Building: An Agenda for Peace (Path II),
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VII. RESISTANCE TO VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DOMESTICJURISDICTION CLA USE
A. Resistance
The desire of every normal person is to want, not merely to
exist within a given State, but to continue to develop economi-
cally, socially, culturally, and politically. This can occur only
through the improvement of the quality of the individual life,
through recognition of his fundamental human rights and ide-
als. The consequences for a nation that dwarfs its citizenry
through rights violations are often quite enormous. Hence, for
the citizens to forestall such violations by forms of resistance is
good for the growth of the nation.
Ideally, government operates as a trustee of the people,
hence the duty upon it in ensuring peace, security, and justice.
Consequently, to dispense injustice or the application of coer-
cion against one ethnic group in order to prevent or weaken its
capacity to oppose authority and its policies constitute a funda-
mental breach by government of its key functions and is nothing
short of a brute and inexcusable violation of human rights.
In the context of this study, it is obvious from the earlier
analysis that the Igbo have good cause to resist the current struc-
ture of marginalization being perpetuated against them by the
federal government of Nigeria since the end of the civil war,
thirty-one years ago. It does not need to be an armed resistance,
which would amount to a treasonable act and may attract severe
reaction from the government and international community.
The right to resist violations may vary depending on the rights
violated in a given situation. There are certain mutual claims
that cannot be ignored without detriment to the well being of
the individual or the very community of which he is a member.
Although human rights violations in Nigeria often occur as aber-
rational violations, not necessarily systematic ones, sometimes
the actions of overzealous government officials result in grave
human rights abuses.1 ° 7
However, international law trusts that States, which are in
NIGERIAWORLD, June 22, 2001 (forwarded by M. 0. Ene), available at http://niger-
iaworld.com/feature/article/nation-building2.html.
107. See Adegbenro, Attorney General of the Republic of Nigeria, W. Nig. L. Rep.
169 (1962); Lekanmi and Kikelomo Ola v. Attorney-General of Western Nigeria, Ife
U.L. Rep. 201 (1971).
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general vested with the duty to implement human rights, will de-
vise ways to cope with violations, which may not rouse a right to
resistance.10 8 The ICCPR and many other human rights instru-
ments'09 reserve States' right to derogate from obligations to
protect certain rights in the event of an armed conflict or public
emergency. The ambiguity and vagueness of these terms en-
ables States to perpetrate violations of rights and not be held
accountable. 1 0 States also possess the necessary instruments to
weaken opposition. Those who utilize the right of resistance are
often likely to suffer hardships, which international pressure
sometimes proves insufficient to ameliorate.
B. Domestic Jurisdiction Clauses
International human rights norms are dictated by an assem-
bly of States, while the domestic application of those norms fall
within the exclusive prerogative of domestic law. International
conventions are not directly enforceable in national courts of
most countries whose legal systems are based upon Common
law, unless their provisions have been incorporated by legislation
into domestic law. There is a growing tendency for national
courts to have regard to these international norms for the pur-
pose of deciding cases where the domestic law is uncertain or
incomplete. However, where national law is clear but inconsis-
tent with the international obligation of the State concerned, in
Common law nations, the national courts are obliged to give ef-
fect to national law."'
The principle of domestic jurisdiction presupposes that
there are "reserve domains" of a State in which its jurisdiction is
exclusive. The U.N. Charter recognizes the principle of non-in-
tervention in the domestic affairs of Member States. It recog-
nizes that there are certain matters that are essentially within the
108. See E.S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. ESCOR, chap XLVII, 1693rd mtg. at 8 (1970).
109. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 4; American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.
Official Records, OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970), reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, art. 15, Nov. 22, 1984, Europ. No. 117, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 435 (1985);
Banjul Charter, supra note 4, art. 11.
110. For instance, Nigeria was not at war when the most draconian decrees were
promulgated.
111. In such a situation, the court should draw the inconsistency to the attention
of the appropriate authorities since the supremacy of national law in no way mitigates a
breach of an international legal obligation.
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domestic jurisdiction of a State and in which other States should
not intervene.' 12 Similarly, the Charter of the OAU barred
Member States of the organization from interfering in the inter-
nal affairs of other Member States.' 13
These provisions have been grossly misinterpreted, depend-
ing on the issue at stake. It has become fashionable for States to
intervene in the reserve domains of other nations when special
national interests need to be protected. This is often a potent
weapon for States such as the great powers, like the United
States and its NATO allies.
The principle of domestic jurisdiction has been effectively
upheld by the international community in situations that relate
to the plight of African countries. This principle was observed
strictly during the Biafra crisis, and during the dictatorships of
Nigeria's past military rulers, except in isolated cases when trade
and other economic embargoes were enforced against the coun-
try. Consequently, domestic jurisdiction has been abused by
many nations at various times and for various reasons. There-
fore, the notion that human rights have become the affairs of
the international community remains a mere symbolic gesture
devoid of any enforceability, and as a result, forewarns the vic-
tims of human rights abuses, who may have a desire to resist, of
the enormous power of the State in respect of domestic jurisdic-
tion.
\1II. THE "PRIMUS INTER PARES" SYNDROME
Igbo society is acephalous. In other words, it is a "chief-less
society." This explains the reason why every Igboman regards
himself as being superior to the next person. Consequently, fol-
lowers are lacking among the Igbo.'1 4 Self-styled leaders abound
112. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
113. ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY CHARTER, art. 3(2), reprinted in BASIC DOCU-
MENTs OF AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 62 (Louis B. Sohn ed., 1971); see, e.g.,
CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, chap. 4, art 19.
However, it was held in the Tunisia-Morocco Nationality case that "[I]f a matter claimed
to fall within the domestic jurisdiction is rooted in a matter of international concern, it
ceases to be a matter of domestic jurisdiction protanto ...." 1923 P.C.IJ. No. 4. In
other words, a matter is removed from domestic jurisdiction if it derives from treaty
obligation or is ajus cogens rule.
114. This is often expressed thus: "Igbo enwe eze" meaning that the Igbo have no
king. If one is able to make some contribution toward the building of a community
school, extending electricity or pipe-borne water etc. in his community, he is honored
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in Igboland. All it takes is some cash or property and some so-
cial status in the community to be able to claim leadership.
Wealth matters so much, that every Igboman places it first and
foremost before every other thing.
The situation the Igbo find themselves in the present day
Nigeria, is partly due to their own lack of unity, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, their defeat in the Nigeria-Biafra inter-
nal armed conflict of 1967-1970.
According to Senator Wabara:
[T]he Igboman has not been able to respect an Igbo leader
because of our economic independence. Any Igboman who
runs into one Naira or two assumes he is the leader from any
part of the world he operates. Without consultations with his
home base, he starts occupying positions and issuing state-
ments that are at variance with the realities of the Igbo situa-
tion. 1 15
As a group, the Igbo have failed as spectacularly as they have
succeeded as individuals. Concepts of responsibility and service
to the people are not tenable among the Igbo. Sanctions against
betrayers of the common cause and punishment against corrup-
tion and mismanagement are not the Igbo way of life." 6 The
resultant lack of unity and common purpose now prevailing
among the Igbo has encouraged others, especially those in posi-
tions of authority in the country, to dismiss them as a bunch of
unserious folks.
Among other major ethnic groups in Nigeria, one or at the
most two tribal associations are enough, and leadership selection
should follow as a matter of course. Presently however, there are
over ten cultural/political associations fighting the so-called
marginalization of the Igbo. The result is that each group de-
signs its own agenda and decides its modus operandi, and more
often than not, these various fronts clash mid-way, even before
reaching the central authority. The rest of Nigeria knows this,
and it has worked tremendously against the Igbo and their cry
for redress or de-marginalization in Nigeria. Be.cause these vari-
ous associations represent their selfish interests, it is often diffi-
with a chieftaincy title, and that serves as a launching pad to arrogate leadership status
for himself.
115. Adulphus Wahara, Interview, GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER, Aug. 18, 1999.
116. Paul Nwawikwu, The Truth About Igbo Maginalisation, GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER,
Editorial, Oct. 27, 1999.
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cult for them to meet and adopt a common strategy, without
each group wanting to dominate the gathering.
In one of such meetings, Eziuche Ubani reported that
"before the summit began.., there was a problem about what to
do with other Igbo leaders like Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, for-
mer Chief of General-Staff, Dr. Chuba Okadigbo, Dr. Sam
Mbakwe, Chief Arthur Nzeribe, Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu,
and Chief C. C. Onoh."1 1
7
Problems began when Chief Onoh could not comprehend
why he and others should be left on the floor. He reacted by
taking his chair and mounting it on the "high table." Dr. J. O.J.
Okezie, a former federal commissioner for agriculture, was an-
gry that the initiators of the meeting did not respect his status by
asking him to sit on the floor with the ordinary people. He was
angry to the extent of picking up a microphone and throwing it
on the "high table." Dr. Basil Nnanna Ukegbu, was roused when
Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu, in his speech, tended to demonstrate
that, the Igbo, having recovered from the psychological inferi-
ority of defeat in the civil war, said that "Igbos will no longer beg,
but take power." To Dr. Ukegbu, it was "this type of boast that
caused the war . . .118
Admittedly, these are highly respected men, whose achieve-
ments in life and contributions to the welfare of the Igbo and
beyond cannot be overemphasized. Having said that, it is
equally important to admit that, because society is dynamic, the
rules of the game called politics very often call for reappraisal.
While every achiever in society is entitled to claim the fruits of
his hard work and respect that is due to him, it is important that
in circumstances as serious as the one the Igbo are confronted
with, a common strategy is agreed upon to advance the cause of
the group.
Leadership is the position, office, or term of a leader; it is
the capacity to be a leader."' A leader is therefore a person who
leads others along an agreed path, a guide. A leader is not nec-
117. Eziuche Ubani, When Igbo Leaders Meet, SUNDAY NEWSPAPER (NIG.), Aug. 9,
1998, at 9. Despite the old intrigues and divisions that nearly marred the meeting,
three important statements were issued in the end: (1) Federalism based on the six
zones, (2) Restructuring of the armed forces etc., and (3) Citizenship rights.
118. Id.
119. AMERACAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 743 (3d ed.
1981).
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essarily a "boss" in the ordinary sense of the word, because lead-
ership, sometimes can be collegial, in which case, decisions are
taken in unanimity. A leader should be able to carry the group
along the well-defined path towards the achievement of the
group's objectives or target. A good leader must command re-
spect from the members of the group, and it is often the way the
group receives the leadership, that determines how seriously or
otherwise outsiders will honor the group and its leadership.
This is a point where the Igbo are different from the Yoruba and
the Hausa/Fulani groups. For example, Afenifere, a pan-Yoruba
cultural association, was headed by late Chief Adekunle Ajasin,
until his death. Chief Abraham Adesanya succeeded him with-
out any power tussle among the many leading Yoruba great men,
equally, of gigantic accomplishments. It is the same smooth suc-
cession and unity of purpose that makes the Arewa Consultative
Forum, the powerful Hausa/Fulani movement that it is in Nige-
ria. This is despite the fact that all the Generals and Presidents
from that region who had ruled the country belong to the Fo-
rum.
Some authorities note that the nature of Igbo autonomy
may explain the relative lack of development of the executive
arm of government. 1211 Such a state of affairs, that thrived in the
days of old, do not conform to the present. If the notion "Igbo
enwe eze" dramatized the principle of self-determination and ex-
plained the absence of large centralized states and empires in
pre-colonial Igboland, that notion no longer fits into the global-
ization era of this day. Things are changing, and very fast too.
Igbo are blessed with men and women of substance, of great
accomplishment both at home and abroad. All that is lacking
among the Igbo is "unity of purpose" or "one-voice culture." A
situation where everyone claims superiority over each other
(primus inter pares) can never enhance group consciousness and
collective responsibility.
The Igbo need an influential personality with nationwide
reach. They are men like Dr. Alex Ekwueme, Chief Odumegwu
120. See, e.g., ADIELE AFIGBo: ROPES OF SANDS-STUDIES IN IGBO HISTORY AND CUL-
TURE (1981); ELIZABETH ISICHEI: A HISTORY OF THE IGBO PEOPLE (1976); see also R.N.
HENDERSON, THE KING IN EVERYMAN 20-23 (1972); STUDIES IN AFRICAN SOCIAL ANTHRO-
POLOGY (Mayer Fortes and S. Paterson eds., 1975); Robin Horton, Stateless Societies In the
History of West Afica, in 1 A HISTORY OF WEST AFRICA (J.F. Ade-Ajayi & M. Crowder eds.,
1971).
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Ojukwu, and Chief Sam Mbakwe, among whom the Igbo can
find good leadership. Chief Arthur Nzeribe has the flexibility of
character and can reach out to the North. However, his recent
skirmishes with the Senate may have led to some disaffection
amongst the Igbo. But if entrusted with a responsibility, Chief
Nzeribe may turn out to speak and fight for the Igbo "cause,"
using his national and international connections to the advan-
tage of the group. In this era of globalization, leadership de-
mands a lot more than chains of traditional chieftaincy titles,
and/or a re-echoing of century old accomplishments.
Someone in whom the Igbo entrust leadership may not nec-
essarily be the eventual presidential candidate. It is important to
stress this point. At this stage of the Igbo struggle, the objective
should not be the presidency, but the grassroots mobilization of
the Igbo. Hopefully, such a candidate will emerge in the course
of events.
IX. PANACEA
The plight of the Igbo in Nigeria concerns their human dig-
nity as well as human rights. The dignity of the Igboman and
the entire Ndigbo is no less than those of the Yugoslavs, Kosovos,
Rwandans, Bosnians, Jews, and others whose plights have at-
tracted considerable international sympathy and action. Self-de-
termination is an element in human dignity, and it is a human
right. Evidently, the Igbo have grossly misplaced their priorities
in claiming their inheritance, which by nature is free, inaliena-
ble, and non-negotiable. The preciousness and dignity of the
individual person is a central humanist value.1 21
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Based on the fore-going analysis, the panacea for the plight
of the Igbo in the Nigerian nation State need to be identified
and focused. To achieve this, the Igbo need to unite and speak
with one voice. First, they should start by forgiving one another
for their bad political skirmishes in the past. Dr. Alex Ekwueme
has set this standard by declaring, "[I] have personally forgiven
all who might have hurt me and I appeal to those who I might
have offended to forgive me."'22 This is imperative for a true
reconciliation to begin at home amongst the Igbo before they
can effectively claim it at the national level.
The recently concluded World Igbo Congress 2001 fell
short of emphasizing the aspect of reconciliation among the
Igbo prior to embarking on the gigantic projects it listed in its
Communiqu6. These projects and programs, no doubt require
implementation, and for this to be done, someone must be sad-
dled with the responsibility to oversee their execution. It is im-
portant, first and foremost, that the Igbo endeavor to resolve
their age long problem of lack of leadership.
The Igbo lack bargaining power under the present structure
in Nigeria. This can be reversed only if the Igbo can have an
Igbo based political party. This will afford the Igbo an opportu-
nity to return in the scheme of things. It should be noted that
no party could win a presidential election without Igbo votes. If
a strong political party is formed that has an Igbo base, things
will change. It is overly simplistic for one to agree that MASSOB
will achieve a political solution to the present plight of the Igbo,
even in the long run.
It is important that while retaining their traditional sec-
tional or community groupings, Igbo leaders should endeavor to
come together under one umbrella for their common good, and
in particular, for the less privileged who look up to them for
better days ahead. This can be achieved only if everyone endeav-
Right and the Right to Development as a Human Right), subsequently published as Developed,
Developing Countries and the Right to Development by the Kurukshetra University Law Jour-
nal, India, 1988. 1 had the privilege and responsibility to have served as the Coordinat-
ing-Secretary for the Workshop, and received invaluable inputs from Mr. David Heaps,
formerly of the Ford Foundation, as well as Mr. Boji Jordan, then exiled head of the
Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa) in Nigeria, among other human rights
supporters.
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ors to de-emphasize his or her natural claim to leadership, while
maintaining his or her natural rights and human dignity.
CONCLUSION
In Human, All Too Human, the German philosopher and na-
tionalist, Friederick Wilheim Nietzsche wrote "A nation usually
rejuvenates itself on the political sick bed and rediscovers its
spirit, which it had gradually lost in seeking for and assertion of
power." 2 ' Nigeria has been on the sick bed since its creation in
1914 by the British. Forty-one years of self-rule has not made
much difference. How much longer will peace and unity elude
Nigeria? How much more time will it take the men and women,
the very few profound and active persons who epitomize the
times, to heed the clarion call and cry by the majority of voices-
the real "beneficiaries" of democracy-for an opportunity to dis-
cuss the terms of the continued corporate existence of Nigeria?
Nigerians have offered thought provoking perspectives to peren-
nial incidences of military interruption of democratization pro-
cess, ethnic disturbances, religious riots, suppression of minority
voices, and demands for social and economic justice, power
equation, marginalization of some ethnic groups and the resul-
tant human rights abuses, and abuse of power by government
and its agencies.
All these and many more worrisome issues in the polity are
not natural. They are man made and can be avoided. Why, for
instance, are the British colonizers still blamed for the woes of
Nigeria, when the opportunity is at the disposal of Nigerians;
when Nigerians can find a real sovereignty and unity d la Nige-
ria? Leaders, past and present, have spoken about unity and
progress, but none had been able to translate the idea into ac-
tion. Under a democratic dispensation, the government is ex-
pected to encourage dialogue to the extent that it is necessary in
the nation's interest.
This Article shall conclude by quoting Alhaji Bukar Usman.
In his book Voices In A Choir: Issues in Democratization And Na-
tional Stability In Nigeria, the author observed:
A choir has an alto, tenor, treble and bass and the choirmas-
ter must mould these various voices into a coherent choir to
123. FRIEDERICK WILHEIM NIETZSCHE, HUMAN, ALL Too HUMAN 169 (trans. R.J.
Hollingdale, 1986) (1878).
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produce a harmonious melody. The same can be said of a
nation such as ours with more than 250 ethnic groups and
languages and dialects, various religious and cultural persua-
sions, different climates, and disparities in educational level
and wealth distribution. In short Nigeria is a country of het-
erogeneity rather than homogeneity and where a country
lacks homogeneity except of course the homogeneity of our
common humanity, what you must then strive is unity in di-
versity. Unity in diversity is like the many colors of a rainbow.
A rainbow is a kaleidoscope of colors which present, in spite
of itself, exemplary beauty and visual harmony ... building
our kind of nation is a difficult, on-going and everlasting chal-
lenge for which the gift of compromise, giving and taking,
minimizing the weakness of the parts and maximizing the
strengths of the whole are necessary pillars for durable archi-
tecture.
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THisDAY SUNDAY NEWSPAPER, Book Review, June 13, 1999 (on file with author). At a
recent public hearing of petitions brought before the Human Rights Violations Com-
mission, by the Arewa Consultative Forum ("ACF"), Ohaneze Ndigbo, Afenifere, Joint
Action Committee on the Middle Belt ("JACOMB"), and Ogbokor Ikwere group, the
Commission's chairman, retired Justice Chukwudifu Oputa lamented that:
[Elvery ethnic group says they are marginalized: where are we going from
there? ... [Tihe greatest problem we have in this country is ethnicity. Ethnic-
ity is not a problem in itself, what makes ethnicity a problem is the psyche of
those who hold strongly unto their ethnic identity. Ethnicity came from the
Europeans with their principle of divide and rule. Are we going to continue
this way?
Ethnicity, Bane of our Society, U.S.-AFRICAN VOICE, Nov. 2001, at 9. In what sounded as a
panacea, the erudite retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria counseled: "The
first thing for us to do is a mental re-orientation, we are still thinking as colonialists
affected us to think. If we can make up our mind to correct ourselves as Nigerians, then
things will move well for us." Id. However, the Chairman was not done without appor-
tioning blame when he asserted:
The elites are those who led this country astray. When they want political
power they say all they should not say; they don't mean it, but the ordinary
people who hear these things take them to heart and when problems start
from there, the elites run away and the poor man suffers .... Government
since 1960 has not been for the people, it has been for the elites.
